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UNCONVENTIONAL W ARF ARE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
TURKISH COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THEIR WESTERN INSPIRA nON 
Nicholas A. Warndorf 
April 19, 2013 
This thesis examines the counterinsurgency efforts of the Ottoman Empire during the 
First World War and the evolutionary process through which those techniques were 
created. The importance of this is to demonstrate the ever changing nature of warfare as 
well as the adaptability a counterinsurgent requires. It also demonstrates how the West 
practiced counterinsurgency techniques over a decade before the First World War and 
that those techniques often led to civilian suffering. By comparing the British and 
American experiences with insurgency in South Africa and the Philippines, this thesis 
shows that population control is one of the most effective counterinsurgency techniques. 
This assertion is based on research of previous counterinsurgents as well as Western 
doctrine. This thesis provides evidence that the Ottoman decision to deport large numbers 
of Armenians was a decision made out of necessity, and considered the most effective 
counterinsurgency technique in the midst of World War I. 
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"Counterinsurgency is an old issue with new currency in the twenty-first 
century ... Counterinsurgency is an issue area where there are many scholar-
practitioners (in contrast to other areas of security studies) which gives their 
writings a certain immediacy and applicability. Many of these scholar-
practitioners are engaged in trying to change the way the militaries understand 
and fight these 'hearts and mind'} , campaigns. ,,/ 
Joanna Spear, Security Studies, 2008 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the Ottoman military application of 
counterinsurgency in Eastern Anatolia during the First World War. It argues that by 
isolating and or removing civilian populations from areas of unrest and rebellion, the 
Ottoman government was able to quell insurgencies, with particular attention given to a 
rebellion in the city of Van. Historically, the Ottoman Empire has been misrepresented in 
the West to the point of only basic recognition. To the average observer, mention of the 
Ottomans or the Turks can either generate discontent and preconceived notions of 
barbarity or a kind of adolescent admiration for the exotic though it is not fully 
understood. This is mainly because the Ottoman Empire's reputation has been so diluted 
by past Western observers that their history, especially their military, is riddled with such 
condemnation that the truth has nearly become indecipherable. It is necessary to examine 
the great civilizations of the past with an open mind and without prejudice if we are to 
better understand the present and hopefully prepare for the future. 
I Joanna Spear, "Counterinsurgency," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 389. 
-1-
The nature of warfare has always and will continue to be a process of 
evolutionary thought in overcoming one's enemies. Contrary to popular belief of the 
uninitiated, warfare is far more complicated than the number of men and the type of 
equipment that is used. It is by definition "a conflict carried on by force of arms, as 
between nations or between parties within a nation.,,2 The nature of such conflicts can 
take a number of different forms. Most widely recognized, of course, is large scale 
conflict that occurs between nations. Warfare, though, is not always the product of 
disagreements among giants. In many cases throughout history, it has been an outlet for 
emerging groups or minorities within a nation in an attempt to throw off the repressive 
yolk of a larger, more powerful opponent. 
The opponent can be an invader or the governmental structure of one's own 
nation. Governments have an inherent need to control their population, whether it be for 
reasons of utilitarian good, striving for the most agreeable living conditions in the minds 
of the masses, or as an attempt to repress and control the masses for the benefit of a few. 
The answer for the minority has often been that of the protracted or prolonged "small 
war," also known as the guerrilla war or insurgency. Such warfare is perhaps the greatest 
enemy to the continuity of a nation because it is a conflict bred from within. Therefore, in 
an effort to combat such threats, nations are forced to adapt and invent new measures in 
order to overcome an almost invisible force which gains momentum with every small 
victory. The United States Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps define such 
tactics in their Small Wars Manual: 
2 "War," last modified December 10,2012, http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/war 
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As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under 
executive authority, wherein military force combined with diplomatic pressure in the 
internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate 
unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the 
foreign policy of a nation.3 
Although the Small Wars Manual was published in 1940, it is one of the first doctrinal 
manuals published on the subject. References to various western manuals throughout the 
twentieth century illuminate the evolution of military thought, as well as an effort to 
combat the changing nature of warfare. 
Vilification of the Ottoman military in historical adaptations has led to the belief 
among many scholars that during the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had made a 
conscious effort to eradicate rural populations of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Upon 
further scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that the Ottomans felt they must act, 
fearing the potential threat of a Russian invasion by developing a fifth column4 
insurgency using discontented Anatolian Armenians. This thesis argues that the Ottoman 
counterinsurgency efforts were bred of a perceived necessity and not a targeted 
aggression toward any specific religious or ethnic group. By comparing 
counterinsurgency efforts of the Ottomans to those of the Americans in the Philippines 
and the British approach in South Africa, this thesis demonstrates that the Ottomans were 
merely adapting contemporary counterinsurgency measures which had already been used 
before by their Western counterparts. Such etlorts mainly focused on the use of forced 
3 Department of the Navy and the USMC, Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. I-I p. I 
4 The term "Fifth Column" was first applied in 1936 to rebel sympathizers inside Madrid when 
four columns of rebel troops were attacking that city. The term is defined as "a clandestine subversive 
organization working within a given country to further an invading enemy's military and political aims. 
(see The American Heritage Dictionary, [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982], "fifth column".) 
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relocations and civilian re-concentration. One only has to examine modem examples such 
as Sri Lanka in order to grasp the concept. 
The Ottoman soldier was among the most courageous, obedient and steadfast of 
battle implements to have ever been applied to warfare. Their bravery alone was enough 
to merit recognition that would resonate in the pages of history. Unfortunately, this is 
often distorted in the twenty first century. Among the many scholars of the Middle East, 
only a few recognize the inadequacies of past research and manage to give credit where it 
is due regarding Muslim soldiers. Illusive histories and subjective recollections from the 
winning side of World War I have often been the source by which all others follow. This 
thesis sheds light on at least one element of Ottoman military conduct during the First 
World War that is still widely and sometimes veraciously debated today. 
A primary argument that this thesis also makes is that the nature of insurgency 
demands a level of adaptation and evolution that is often difficult to understand for those 
unfamiliar with irregular warfare. The approach to insurgency by Western empires 
differed little from the approaches used by the Ottoman Empire to secure areas of 
contention through the isolation of civilian populations. None has proven more influential 
or controversial than the calculated use of concentration camps and relocation. This is 
evident in the examination of the American application in the Spanish-American War of 
1898, the Philippine-American war of 1899-1902, and the British use of concentration 
camps during the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. Each conflict predates the First World 
War and remains an example of Western technique5 which the Ottomans later used. 
5 Technique is the appropriate word to use because the concept of a standardized doctrine in 
counterinsurgency operations was not effectively developed until after World War II. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this paper, I have chosen to use the word "technique" in order to refer to western and Ottoman 
counterinsurgency measures rather than "doctrine," which is the accepted designation today. 
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Based on historical evidence and the insights of contemporary Middle Eastern military 
scholars, the Ottoman response was not only appropriate but viewed as ultimately 
necessary, in the context of the time, to insure the continuity of the Empire. Faced with 
heavy Russian opposition and the threat of a potential fifth column from the Ottoman 
Armenian Christians of Eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire responded to internal 
threats in a way intended to save their Muslim subjects that were dying by the millions, 
while also repelling a Russian invasion during World War I. 
The threat of insurgency is not a new concept. However, the need to combat 
unconventional warfare while maintaining political integrity abroad has become a 
growing concern for virtually every emerging super power of the last three hundred 
years. With regard to quelling rebellion and fighting an enemy within, few nations have 
received more consistent scrutiny than the Turks. Wartime propaganda and 
sensationalism of the Western press during World War I has persisted even today, calling 
the Ottoman response to internal security threats" genocide" and "massacre" of innocent 
civilians.6 The reality, however, is that Armenian rebels who were willing to utilize 
murder, kidnapping, public executions, propaganda, smuggling, bombings, and desertion 
from the Ottoman military - virtually anything that would weaken the Turks - often goes 
unmentioned. 
Genocide is not a valid accusation when examining this period of Ottoman 
history. By definition, the word means "The systematic, planned annihilation of a racial, 
political, or cultural group.,,7 Modem scholars of the subject often point to the Turkish 
relocation of Armenians during the war as the definitive moment that marked their 
6 "Armenian Genocide," last modified April 16.,2012, 
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/armeniangenocide.html 
7 The American Heritage Dictionary, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), "Genocide" 
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planned annihilation. History has proven, however, that the West has a short memory 
with regard to insurgency techniques. The relocation of perceived combatants has been 
common with regard to national security in Western military practice both before and 
since World War I, with the use of internment by the British during the Second Boer War 
and also by the United States during World War II with the internment of Japanese 
Americans following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Ottoman military showed 
remarkable restraint in times of great emotional turmoil regarding relocation and securing 
areas under insurgent control. Recent research has also shown that according to Ottoman 
records, Turkish military conduct was often the equivalent, ifnot superior, to Western 
military conduct when fighting an unconventional war. 
The study of irregular or unconventional warfare during the First World War is 
essential if both scholars and practitioners are to better understand the changing nature of 
twenty-first century conflict with any nation, against any enemy, both foreign and 
domestic. Karl Von Clausewitz, soldier and military theorist wrote that "Theory exists so 
that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing [sic] 
through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the 
mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, 
not accompany him to the battlefield."g Contemplation and adaptation are not enough if 
one does not recognize the successes and failures of past engagements, wherever and 
whenever they may have occurred. 
Contemporary military doctrine of the West and tested attempts at subduing 
civilian populations are proof enough that although such methods continue to receive 
8 David Lonsdale, "Strategy," in Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. David Lonsdale et al. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20. 
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condemnation, they are nevertheless continually applied to combat unconventional 
warfare. The difference between the early twentieth century and present 
counterinsurgency measures is that there is heavier focus today on a more humanitarian 
solution. By the comparison of Ottoman techniques to their Western precursors, this 
thesis argues that their methods were learned and adapted, not invented. That is why I 
have chosen to focus heavily on the formation of the Ottoman military and how their own 
experiences in the Balkans helped to shape their approach to Eastern Anatolia. It is also 
why I have chosen to compare those methods to the current military doctrine of the 
United States, as well as the practices of both the British and Americans prior to World 
War I. Their experiences highlight the reality that sometimes, the focus on achieving 
victory can overshadow the concern for reducing collateral damage. They also prove that 




HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
Among the many problems with research on the First World War and Ottoman 
approaches to irregular warfare are the glaring gaps in research on the subject. 
Definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency are often too vague or contradictory, if 
they are even mentioned at all. Ottoman relocations and civilian concentration is roundly 
criticized as genocide and calculated pogroms against the Armenian people. Yet, at the 
same time, western recollections of past engagements using the same methods are 
referred to as re-concentration in the Spanish American war and the Philippines, 
Internment camps during WWII, strategic hamlets in Vietnam9, and camps in South 
Africa during the Second Boer War. Regardless of one's position on the subject, it is 
undeniable that civilian non-combatants generally pay the greatest price in war. 
Regarding insurgencies, however, knowing the difference between combatant and non-
combatant becomes incredibly difficult. 
For this reason, I have taken a three pronged approach to my argument regarding 
methodology and sources. First, I explain the evolution of Ottoman military strategy and 
how their experiences in the Balkans and military restructuring led to their 
counterinsurgency techniques used in the First World War. This section focuses heavily 
on the rebellion at Van and how the Armenian struggle against the Ottoman government 
9 Thomas L. Ahem Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 20 I 0), 76-78. 
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can be classified as an insurgency. By focusing on the Ottomans first and their military 
tactics prior to and during World War I, it is my argument that the empire mainly acted in 
the interest of self preservation and not out of religious or ethnic hatred regarding the 
Armenians of eastern Anatolia. 
Secondly, in order to encompass theory and practice, that is, what is written by 
scholars and how applicable such theories are on the ground, I have decided to utilize 
both scholarly examinations of previous conflicts for their historical context as well as 
doctrinal practice in western military manuals on counterinsurgency. Accompanying the 
scholarly interpretations of irregular warfare, I have also chosen to apply the writings of 
both insurgents and counterinsurgents such as Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, and T.E. 
Lawrence among others. These two different perspectives are referenced throughout my 
thesis but are mainly used regarding the application of concentration and relocation by 
Great Britain and America. Focusing on each country's respective conflicts and their own 
experiences with insurgency abroad provides a framework for comparing how two 
western empires conducted counterinsurgency prior to the Ottomans. 
The third aspect of my research is an analysis of the western approach versus the 
Ottoman approach to counterinsurgency, highlighting their similarities and their 
differences. Pointing to both western adaptations of war and Ottoman adaptations paints a 
more accurate picture regarding the fickle nature of historical representation. By using 
such methods, this thesis asserts that through the comparison and contrast of Ottoman 
counterinsurgency techniques ofthe First World War to their western precursors the 
research reflects that Ottoman methods were learned and adapted, not invented. It is also 
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intended to demonstrate that the nature of irregular warfare demands drastic measures 
from any nation. 
In studying the art of unconventional warfare, it is essential to consult the 
expertise of previous practitioners. Irregular war can be traced back to the Old Testament 
in the first and second books of Maccabee. The stories describe the Jewish family of 
Maccabeus' guerrilla campaign of irregular warfare against their Syrian oppressors, led 
by Judas Maccabeus. The stories tell of their insurgent efforts which ended in a treaty 
with the Syrians in 158 BCE. IO Perhaps the most recognizable figure in the nature of 
warfare with special emphasis on irregular tactics, however, dates back to fifth century 
China and writings in Sun Tzu's The Art of War. The book is a collection of writings by 
Chinese military strategists written for the sole purpose of attaining victory and 
overcoming one's enemies, both on and off the battlefield. The significance of these 
references is the recognition that not only is the concept of irregular warfare an ancient 
contemplation, it is also evolving with every new generation of soldier and the 
implements of war that he or she uses. On the use of military force, Sun Tzu writes: 
The military is a Tao of deception -Thus when able, manifest inability. When 
active, manifest inactivity. When near, manifest as far. When far, manifest as near. Thus 
when he seeks advantage, lure him. When he is in chaos, take him. When he is 
substantial, prepare against him. When he is strong, avoid him. When he is wrathful, 
harass him. Attack where he is unprepared. Emerge where he does not expect it. II 
In hindsight the concept seems simple enough. It is important to remember, 
however, that such notions of warfare can apply to the offensive and defensive 
movements of both a larger and smaller force. The West has dealt with a number of 
10 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their 
opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 200 I), I 
II Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans. The Denma Translation Group (Boston: Shambhala Publications 
Inc., 2002), 5. 
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instances in a number of theaters where numbers do not always count for everything. 
This is evident throughout the colonial expansion period of western empires abroad and 
continued into the island fighting of the Pacific during World War II. It is even more 
prevalent in the twenty-first century with coalition forces' efforts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
Many scholarly sources point to a number of different aspects that must be 
considered when fighting an unconventional war. Definitions of warfare, of which there 
are many, can often be misleading and malleable to virtually any situation. David 
Lonsdale, Professor from the Department of Politics and International Studies at the 
University of Hull argues that, "Definitions (of war) that focus simply on body count are 
simplistic to the point of absurdity, ignoring the political and legal implications of 
defining war, in addition to saying nothing about the actual conduct of military 
operations.,,[2 Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, it is essential to narrow down the 
varying degrees of warfare and how it applies to the Ottomans by focusing on what types 
of irregular warfare exist. James Kiras, Professor at Air University of the United States 
Air Force from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, has argued that there are 
in fact five forms of irregular warfare which are adequately described in this table from a 
book he coauthored titled Understanding Modern Warfare. 
11 Lonsdale, "Strategy." 1. 
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Table 2.1 Forms oflrregular Warfare 13 
Type Resources Center of Mechanism Strategic Tactical Duration 
Gravity Orientation Orientation 
Coup d'etat Few Elites Seizure of Offensive Offensive Immediate 
(organize) power 
Terrorism Few Elites Coercion Offensive Offensive Lengthy 
(influence) 
Revolution Vanguard, Population Popular Defensive Offensive As quickly 
growing to (Stimulate) support as possible 
many (uprising) 
Insurgency Varied, but Population Denial Defensive, Offensive, Lengthy 
often (Control) leading to switching to given local 




Civil War Varies Varies Denial or Varies Varies Varies 
negotiated 
settlement 
It is necessary to examine the meaning of insurgency and counterinsurgency from 
a variety of sources in order to better understand the complexities of unconventional 
warfare. By defining the two and their application in past and present military conflicts, it 
is my intention to clarify such encompassing concepts to better direct the reader toward a 
clear understanding of the topic. It would be unwise to focus on all forms of irregular 
warfare because the scope of such a topic exceeds the capacity of this thesis. It is also 
necessary to recognize the importance of the "center of gravity" distinction in defining 
forms of warfare. Though the specific class of society is subject to change with the type 
of warfare, the fact remains that the focus is on the civilian population. 
13 James Kiras, "Irregular Warfare," In Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. James Kiras et al. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 234. 
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Insurgency 
The revolutionaries almost invariably find it easier to establish themselves in the 
'countryside'- isolated, difficult terrain where the governing authorities are weakest, 
know least what is going-on, and show the least interest. Here the revolutionary political 
network and propagandists manage to get enough recruits to form their terrorists into 
small, local guerrilla bands. 14 
Though the "countryside" argument has been disproven by the American 
Revolution and American experiences in Iraq during the twenty-first century, the 
countryside still remains an effective place to begin. An insurgency is a threat which 
generally builds from within a country due to hostility toward the government or a 
foreign occupying power. A guerrilla war is often the vehicle by which a smaller 
insurgent force makes their demands known to the larger, more powerful opponent when 
all other negotiations have failed. In many cases, armed conflict begins by way of the 
guerrilla war, with the guerrilla or partisan as its warrior. Where regular armies fight in 
open conflict with one another on a large scale, the guerrilla often chooses to utilize hit-
and-run tactics whereby smaller, irregular fighting forces conduct surprise attacks on 
larger forces and then dissolve into their indigenous habitat. The favored techniques of 
insurgents include, but are not limited to: bombs and bomb making, coercion, 
kidnapping, assassination, terrorism, bribery, theft, and any number of other approaches 
that will provide expediency toward their ultimate goal. Such techniques are intended to 
destabilize the government or invader by constantly keeping them on the defensive 
against a force which they cannot directly assault due to its clandestine nature and natural 
cover within their own indigenous elements such as jungles, cities, and mountainous 
terrain. 
14 10hn 1. McCuen, The Art o(Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o/Counter Insurgency 
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966),33. 
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According to Bard O'Neill, professor of international affairs at the National War 
College in Washington, D.C., there are three groups of people who fit the ideal criteria 
within an insurgency which provide favorable conditions: Parochials, Subjects and 
Participants. O'Neill argues that Parochials are, "Those citizens who have little or no 
awareness of the political system at the national level and no perception of their ability to 
influence it." These individuals are generally illiterate, live at the subsistence level in 
isolated areas and generally prefer to be left alone. Such individuals can be compared to 
Kurdish tribes in Anatolia, the Arabs of Saudi Arabia and the Armenians of eastern 
Anatolia. Subjects "have become part of the political system and are aware of its impact 
on their lives but are not directly active in shaping policy." Participants "are generally 
educated citizens who are cognizant of national political institutions and policies and 
wish to engage actively in the decision-making process." These individuals are generally 
educated, confident of their impact on policy change and vulnerable to recruitment by 
insurgents. This is perhaps because their involvement offers a shortcut to political 
recognition that would otherwise take time within a system of bureaucratic policy and 
regulation - a system which they already condemn. 15 
According to the United States Army and the Marine Corps, there are a number of 
different forms that an insurgency can take. 16 One is of a conspiratorial nature; an 
example of this being the Bolshevik revolution of twentieth century Russia or the Young 
Turk rebellion of the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Conspiratorial insurgencies involve 
exactly what the name implies, groups of conspirators meeting in secret, generally 
15 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, (Washington 
D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005),83 
16 United States Department of the Anny, The us. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 114 
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educated, dreaming up plans to overthrow the government. Another form is of a military 
focused nature. Examples of this can be found all over Latin America, but perhaps the 
most influential would be the efforts of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba. This form 
of warfare is also known as "Focoism," I 7 which consists of small paramilitary bands of 
fighters using an insurrection itself to create the conditions necessary to overthrow the 
government. 18 Therefore, if bands of resistance fighters defy the government, the 
government response, which can sometimes be violent, targets any and all suspects, 
showing the true nature of the government and drawing attention to the guerrillas' cause. 
Urban insurgencies are those fought mainly in heavily populated urban centers, 
usually within key districts or cities which are crucial to a nations' stability. An example 
of this would be the efforts of AI-Qaeda, The Taliban and the IRA (Irish Republican 
Army). Perhaps the most recognizable form of urban insurgency would be the efforts of 
the IRA. They remain without question an example of what has been called a "surgical" 
approach to irregular warfare within the confines of an urban environment. 19 Protracted 
Popular Warfare is the form of insurgency that Mao Tse-tung utilized in the Chinese 
Revolution and was later adapted by the North Vietnamese. This form of warfare is 
meant to create popular support for governmental reorganization by draining the enemy 
of resources, man power and the will to carryon the fight with a political ideology in 
place, which in China and Vietnam's case was communism.2o 
17 The tenn was inspired by the Cuban revolution but is perhaps more recognizable as a "peoples 
war" and how it has since been adopted by AI-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
18 This has also been referred to as the "ink-blot" effect, a comparison to the nature of ink drops on 
paper beginning small in various locations and slowly spreading from its point of contact. 
19 Patrick D. Marques, "Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments" (M.A. Thesis, US 
Anny Command and General Staff College, 2003) 23-24. 
20 United States Department of the Anny, The u.s. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 9 
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Co unterinsurgency 
The accumulated effect of these revolutionary wars, and there seems to be no end 
to them, is extremely serious and vitally concerns us all. Whatever the result, the 
protracted nature of each struggle does immense long-term damage, particularly to rural 
communities where, to add to all the other problems, the population is increasing at an 
alarming rate. The so-called newly emerging forc(;:s are rapidly in danger of becoming the 
~ . 21 luture starvmg masses. 
Counterinsurgency is the process by which a government or an outside force 
attempts to reverse the effects of insurgency within a nation that is on the verge of 
internal collapse or has already imploded. According to the U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps, "Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, 
counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish 
political order and legitimacy where these conditions no longer exist.,,22 
It must be said and cannot be overstated that the versatility of counterinsurgency 
requires a special breed of unit commander to face the challenges of such dynamic 
obstacles. There are a number of reasons why guerTillas/insurgents are frustrating to 
regular forces, but perhaps the most frustrating aspects are that they do not don 
conventional uniforms, they are not bound by a military code of conduct, and their 
support base can come from anywhere at any time. 23 
Guerrillas also adapt faster than regular forces because they have to and there is 
little doctrine behind their tactics, it is mostly theory in practice. All warfare is ever 
changing; however, guerrilla warfare or insurgencies are often a reaction to modernity, 
political change and combating the technology of the future using more elementary 
21 Robert Thompson, introduction to The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of 
Counter Insurgency; by John J. McCuen (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 15 
22 US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 8 
23 Department of the Navy and the USMC. Small Wars Manual (Washington: The United States 
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. 1-8 p. 12 
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methods and techniques. Due to this fact, insurgents/guerrillas are typically forced to 
change their strategies rapidly and regularly in order to adapt and respond to their foes. 
So too must the counterinsurgent adapt their tactics in order to reverse engineer the 
effects of an insurgency. 
This is exactly what Colonel 10hn 1. McCuen argued in his book The Art of 
Counter-Revolutionary War. McCuen, who was an expert on insurgency and served a 
number of staff positions in the United States, Indonesia, Vietnam, Germany and 
Thailand, argues that the only way to fight an insurgency is to understand its structure 
and principles and then reverse the effects of each based on the phase of warfare in which 
the insurgency resides. McCuen argues that "A m,tior technique of revolutionary strategy 
is to deceive the governing authorities into making too little effort too late with tactics 
inappropriate to the particular stage of the war:,24 That is to say, the intent from the 
beginning is deception; to lure the enemy into a false sense of security so that a random 
strike will not only be a surprise but confusing. McCuen's book was published in 1966, 
making it more of a reaction to Mao's form of warfare, "the protracted war" or "people's 
war." The revolutionary war, which was a popular view at the time, refers to a swift form 
of warfare aimed at regime change, whereas an insurgency aims at resistance and denial 
of enemy aims. 
McCuen asserts that there are four phases of strategic evolution in insurgencies. 
The first phase is Organization - involving the uses of propaganda and recruitment in 
order to supplement the ranks of the insurgency. The second phase is Terrorism, which 
would involve small attacks on key targets in order to draw attention to the cause. The 
24 John J. McCuen, The Art o/Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o{Counter Insurgency 
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 
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third is Guerrilla warfare in which case the terrorist cells begin to form cohesive units and 
strategically carry out hit-and-run attacks. The last phase is Mobile Warfare, which is an 
overt war against the govemment.25 McCuen does stipulate that these phases often 
overlap each other and can occur at different phases in different parts of the same 
country. This is not important, however, because what truly matters for the 
counterinsurgent is the recognition of which phase: he is combating. This is how, McCuen 
argues, one becomes capable of combating an insurgency. Recognition will then, by 
implication, lead to a reversal of the process. Counterinsurgency is not as simple as just 
fighting fire with fire, throwing clandestine commandos at guerrillas in the bushes, 
mountains and jungles. 
Mao Tse-tung wrote, "What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? 
Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do 
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and 
assistance cannot be gained.,,26 If the aim of the counterinsurgent is to reverse the effects 
of the insurgency, then he too must gain the support and confidence of the indigenous 
population. Mao has been widely considered one of history's greatest 
guerrillaslinsurgents, specifically because of his expertise developed from deep 
philosophical reflections and a unique understanding of the Chinese people. However, his 
concepts and conviction were not met with immediate support. In fact, it was not until 
mounting Communist losses, fighting in plain sight, that Mao's approach was adopted?7 
25 Ibid, 40 
26 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith" (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2000), 43. 
27 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 72. 
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Mao recognized the importance and necessity of support, but he also recognized the need 
for regaining the upper hand through organization and support from within. 
This is why it is also necessary to recognize the cultural dynamics of a conflict if 
one intends to combat an insurgency. McCuen focuses very little on this aspect. O'Neill 
states that any analysis of insurgency would be "seriously deficient" if it ignores a 
country's political culture. O'Neill argues, "Hence:, an effort to understand and profile the 
political carefully is very important; in doing so, students of insurgency need to rely on 
the expertise of regional and country specialists, particularly historians, anthropologists, 
and sociologists.,,28 Knowing the regional dynamics is an obvious path to defeating an 
insurgency. Knowing one's enemy is one of the bt:st ways to counter his efforts. 
That being said, it pays to understand the indigenous population and their feelings 
toward the insurgency itself. One reason for this is to better understand their level of 
tolerance. O'Neill argues that "Where there is a low tolerance for violence, insurgent 
recruitment will suffer, and violent acts, particularly dramatic, terrorist ones, will 
probably be considered repugnant, ifnot counterproductive.,,29 This is an important point 
because it illustrates that the indigenous population can either be the greatest weapon 
against an insurgency or the counterinsurgents' worst fear. Take for example the negative 
reaction of Italians toward the Red Brigades in the kidnap and murder of Prime Minister 
Aldo Moro in 1978. Or, yet another example is the negative public reaction to the 
indiscriminate killing of foreign tourists at Luxor in Egypt in 1997. Both examples are 
proof that if the insurgents miscalculate the threshold of tolerance that the public has for 
their cause then it can break their organization. However, the same can be said of 
28 O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism" 85. 
29 Ibid 
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counterinsurgents' efforts. If brutal tactics are applied in a manner that the public is not 
willing to accept, it can easily draw recruits to the insurgency and become 
counterproductive. 
Techniques of the Counterinsurgent 
Counterinsurgency operations are labor intensive and often depend upon a large 
force in order to suppress enemy forces and influence. Counterinsurgents must maintain 
order and security over a wide area where the insurgents only have to remain hidden and 
strike whenever and wherever they like. Insurgents do, however, have a number of 
vulnerabilities that the counterinsurgents can then utilize and exploit to their advantage in 
reversing the effects of an insurgency. One is their need for secrecy. The level of secrecy 
required in starting and maintaining an insurgency makes it very difficult for its fighters 
to relax and know who to trust. There is also a need to establish bases which depends on 
the natural cover and support of the local population, if there is one. There are 
inconsistencies in mobilizing guerrilla forces because of the difficulties of 
communication. Cohesive action as a collective unit can be difficult when there are 
communication challenges. There is heavy reliance on external support in order to sustain 
and maintain guerrilla forces with a special emphasis on financial backing. If that lifeline 
is ever severed then the insurgency is hard pressed to survive. There is a constant need to 
maintain momentum and to present a cause worth fighting for as well as a display of 
one's victories. This prevents desertion, internal divisions and a drop in morale. Finally, 
there is the greatest threat from informants within the insurgency.3D 
30 US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 31 
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With so many weaknesses looming within and around an insurgent organization, 
it would seem that combating such a threat with an overwhelming force would be easy to 
accomplish. However, the reality is often much different. The greatest challenge in 
countering an insurgency is knowing the acceptable level of force to apply. The US Army 
presently states that, "Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, 
however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefilllly the type and amount of force to be 
applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is 
counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the: recruitment of fifty more 
insurgents.,,3] If this is the case then where is the middle ground? It is a safe assumption 
that a lack of force can also result in the recruitment of more insurgents because it can be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness. Insurgent propaganda during the recruitment phase, 
according to the phases laid out by McCuen, can also claim that the frailty of the enemy 
is an indication of success. 
In many cases throughout the history of insurgencies, the indigenous forces rely 
heavily upon the local inhabitants for cover, food, supplies, information and 
communication. One way of combating the threat of insurgency's and exploiting their 
weaknesses, is to prevent them from establishing bases and cutting off their 
supply/support network. Hypothetically, counterinsurgents can try to be everywhere at 
once or they can remove the civilian population and establish the insurgent area as a war 
zone or danger zone. Anyone remaining within that zone can then be considered a 
combatant and dealt with accordingly. The concentrated population or deportees are then 
moved to a safe zone under government and local protection to establish order in an area. 
Such techniques are also intended to combat the insurgent threat while minimizing the 
,I us Anny, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 45 
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collateral damage and civilian suffering, or so it is intended in planning. A reason for 
removing civilians from the equation is illustrated by the Department of the Navy and the 
USMC: 
Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to obtain supplies 
which are then secreted in remote strongholds. Seizure and destruction of such sources of 
supply is an important factor in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods of 
operation must be studied and adapted to the psychological reaction they will produce 
upon the opponents.32 
The statement is a compelling argument which encompasses the potential threat from an 
indigenous population in foreign and domestic conflicts. It also assists in illustrating the 
motivations for isolating civilians in areas of contention in order to weed out the threat. 
32 Department of the Navy and the USMC, Small Wars Manual (Washington: The United States 
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. 1-8 p.12-13 
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CHAPTER III 
OTTOMAN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE REBELLION AT V AN 
"In war, knowing how to recognize and seize an opportunity is the most important 
ability. ,,33 
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art o/War, 1519-1520 
Study of the construction of the Ottoman Military is necessary in order to paint a 
more accurate picture of the Turkish soldier and their commanders. Evidence shows that 
there are a number of myths about the Ottoman military which must be rectified if one is 
to understand the mind set and the discipline of Ottoman soldiers during the First World 
War. This chapter also provides examples of how Ottomans dealt with rebellion in the 
past as well as how Western powers have dealt with them since in order to show the 
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency techniques which have been applied by both. This 
chapter demonstrates that the Armenian rebel network was both vast and sophisticated, 
posing a very real threat to the Ottoman empire during the First World War. And finally, 
this chapter demonstrates the effects of Ottoman counterinsurgency in Eastern Anatolia. 
Perhaps the most pertinent aspect, however, is the mindset of the Ottoman soldier and the 
formation of the Turkish military. 
33 Peter Constantine, ed. & trans., The Essential Writings of Machiavelli. (New York: The Modem 
Library, 2007), 312. 
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The Ottoman Military and Popular Mythology 
According to Dr. Edward J. Erickson, military historian and retired U.S. Army Lt. 
Colonel, there are five myths about the Turkish military that often go unchecked. One 
myth is that the Germans during the First World War commanded and planned most of 
the Ottoman operations throughout the war.34 Statements like this have degraded the 
military talents of more than capable commanders in the Turkish military such as 
Mustafa Kemal, the man primarily responsible for the Turkish defeat of the Entente 
powers during the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916.35 Erickson says that men 
like Mustafa Kemal "fall into this category of audacious combat leaders without whose 
presence a Turkish victory is questionable. ,,36 It is from this Turkish commander that the 
famous quote: "I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die! In the time which passes 
until we die, other troops and commanders can take our place!" is an example of the 
Turkish military mindset.37 Many contemporary scholars tend to exaggerate the influence 
of the contending entente powers with regard to Ottoman longevity in resisting foreign 
powers throughout the war. Most accounts would portray a sense of disloyalty and 
disunity among the entente powers as a reason for Turkish resilience. Such ideas merely 
ignore or underestimate the contributions of the Ottoman military, which fought a war on 
multiple fronts against multiple enemies, both foreign and domestic.38 
34 Edward 1. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History a/the Ottoman Army in the First World War, 
(London: Greenwood Press, 2001, 214 
35 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 79-95 
36 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 85 
37 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 83 
38 Mesut Uyar, Edward 1. Erickson, A Military History ()(the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk, 
(Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2009), 282 
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The second myth is that the Ottoman government and the Turkish military kept 
poor records.39 Nothing could be further from the truth. Erickson argues that "the 
Ottomans literally invented bureaucracy and red tape, and they kept most of their records 
no matter how trivial," and that "The Turkish General Staff Archives alone contain 1.5 
million documents on the First World War.,,40 This is at least some indication of the 
obsessive record keeping of the Ottomans. A problem which is often overlooked is that 
many scholars rely mainly on Western sources rather than Ottoman records because they 
are primarily in Turkish. 
The third is that Ottoman units were prone to desertion during combat and that 
they had a tendency to disintegrate under the pressure of war. The truth is, according to 
Erickson, that the units which had historically sufD~red mass disintegration were in fact 
non-Turkish formations of only regimental strength and below. Erickson argues that 
"Desertions occurred primarily during unit movements across the empire, during lulls in 
action, and from hospitals in the rear areas.,,41 These desertions are emblematic of the 
Kurdish and various Arab tribesmen who were often used by the empire to supplement its 
lacking cavalry strength, men who generally only maintained an allegiance to money or 
tribe. Military history of World War I has shown time and again that the Turkish military 
strength consisted mainly of a strong defense and unwavering resol ve. The book 
Caucasian Battlefields by Allen and Muratoffhas become one of the best known works 
on the Eastern Anatolian campaigns from 1828 to 1921. The book regularly references 




the courage and "traditional stubbornness in defense," which characterizes the Turkish 
'1' 42 ml ltary. 
The myth of desertion is linked to what has also been claimed as an unusually 
high rate of casualty in the Ottoman Empire. The fact is, however, that many sources are 
based on over estimated Russian sources and also do not account for loss due to the 
elements such as disease, starvation and frostbite. According to Erickson, "The actual 
combat related loss rate (l 0.6 percent) was similar to that of other combatants. Disease 
was the great killer of men, particularly in Mesopotamia and in Caucasia.,,43 Eastern 
Anatolia often witnessed the overly ambitious machinations of Enver Pa~a, Minister of 
War in the Ottoman Empire. The grand plans of Enver Pa~a often required the Ottoman 
military to perform incredible feats with very little support. One example is that of the 
Sankaml~ campaign of 191444, in which the military traversed hundreds of miles of brutal 
mountain terrain with little food, equipment and clothing, resulting in the loss of around 
75,000 men and most of their artillery, a substantial part of the Turkish III army, 
according to Allen and Muratoff, among others.45 According to Edward Erickson, 
however, the number of casualties is closer to 50,000.46 The Turkish III army was 
comprised of the empire's seasoned battle veterans who did not require additional 
training. They were the men who trained the others, a valuable resource within a military 
stretched so thin. This debacle right at the outset of the war undoubtedly crippled the 
Ottoman defense and preparation strategy even more than it had been already. 
42 W.E.D AIIen, Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-
Caucasian Border 1828-192, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953),39 
43 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 215 
44 This is an important aspect in reviewing Ottoman military history because the defeat at 
Sankaml~ came just one year before the Annenian rebeIlion at Van, at a time when the Ottoman military 
had already been stretched thin and resources, both materiaIly and in knowledge were in short supply. 
45 AIIen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 284 
46 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 60 
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The last myth refers to Enver Pa!?a and the plans of the CUP (Committee of Union 
and Progress).47 The assumption is often that Enve:r Pa!?a and the CUP intended to regain 
the land that had been lost during the previous wars in the Balkans and the land in the 
East during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. This is based on the notion of Pan-
Turanism, or the unification of Muslims throughout the Empire and elsewhere under a 
common ethnic connection with the Ottoman Turks at the heart of the movement. 
According to Erickson and others, the reality is that a massive Ottoman offensive in the 
East was merely the result of timing and advantage in the wake of the Russian revolution 
rather than a part of carefully formulated military strategy. Erickson argues that "This is 
illustrated by the fact that the recovery of irredentist territory in Caucasia or in the former 
Turkey-in-Europe never appeared in the prewar campaign planning process.,,48 
Formation of the Ottoman Military and the Situation in the East 
"Probably the greatest injustice done to this magnificent fighting army was the 
gross distribution of its reputation, its ethos, and its character by erroneous historical 
perceptions. ,,49 
Prior to the 1860' s, the Ottoman Military had been constructed over the years in 
such a way that it was more about loyalty to the Sultan than tactics and restructuring. Up 
to this point in history, the Ottomans had been defeated by their European enemies again 
and again with very little time in between to incorporate the much needed reforms that 
were well overdue. At the time, there had existed a system of combating new problems 
47 "The Young Turk movement attracted an unusual mix of Turks, including intelligentsia, liberal 
thinkers, as well as numerous military and naval officers. The most prominent of these groups was the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Naturally this movement was perceived as a threat to the 
sultanate of Abdulhamit II, who sought to suppress it both inside and outside of his empire. The army 
officers who secretly joined these groups maintained active cells in Damascus and Salonika."( See 
Erickson, Ordered to Die, I) 
48 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 214 
49 Erickson, Ordered to Die, xix 
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with old tactics.50 It is also worth noting that the Ottomans could barely afford to pay 
their soldiers after years of constant warfare and loss, let alone invest in artillery and 
naval gunships. Fortunately, out of the Balkan wars of the nineteenth century, there 
emerged a new corps of well trained officers within the Ottoman military structure which 
"revitalized the army. ,,51 Prior to the reforms of th~: 1860' s, the glaring weakness of the 
Ottoman military corps had been the incompetency of its officer corps with regard to 
training and tactics. 52 Therefore, the Ottomans recognized an opportunity to invest in 
their leadership instead. The defeat of the Ottomans in the East by General Peskevich and 
the Russians, as well as the Egyptian Army of Mehmet Ali during the thirties, was at least 
some indication that the Ottomans were the weakest on their Asiatic Frontiers. 53 
Prussian prestige was beginning to replace that of the British. German advisors 
began to replace British, Polish and Hungarian emigre officers which had carried over 
after the Crimean War of 1853 _1856.54 It was between the Crimean War and the 1877-78 
Russo-Turkish War that the Ottoman reforms began to take effect in the military. New 
officer school curriculums were developed to focus more on tactics than technical 
training and theory. Unfortunately, even with the advancements in curriculum, the 
Ottoman government ultimately could not afford the field training that was desperately 
needed to train new recruits and new commanders. 55 Regardless, Ottoman success can be 
50 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History a/the Ottomans, 203 
51 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History a/the Ottomans, 175 
52 Allen an d Muratoff, Caucasian Battlejield~, 113 
5' 
J Allen and Muratoff, 109 
54 Allen and Muratoff, III 
55 Prior to the Ottoman losses in the Balkans, and according to general military standards, even as 
they are today, it was preferable to utilize live fire exercises in battle training in order to provide the new 
recruits with a closer understanding of war. However, the Ottoman government could not afford to spare 
the money, time and supplies necessary to fulfill the live fire training exercises. 
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directly linked to this new school of thought since the 1860's ultimately represented a 
"renaissance of Ottoman military capacity. ,,56 
Unfortunately for the Ottomans, the Officer corps was not enough to salvage their 
lacking cavalry and manpower when compared to the Russians in the 1877-78 war. As 
Erickson argues, the cavalry of the Ottomans was their main military weakness in every 
action during the Russo-Turkish war. Poor cavalry meant an inability to match one's 
enemy on the battlefield in an assault, an inability to protect your troops during a retreat 
and also to pursue Russian forces in retreat after an Ottoman victory.57 The Turks, whose 
defensive proficiency cannot be stressed enough, often fought from a fortified position in 
Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, having defeated a Russian force attacking their position, it 
would have been crucial to pursue them as they fled. Without cavalry this was not 
feasible and would have been dangerous for Ottoman forces if they pursued on foot, not 
only in weakening defenses but also risking vulnerability during a counter attack. This 
helps to explain, in part, one major reason why the Ottomans were unable to defeat the 
Russians. 
The new Ottoman officer corps (Mekteblis, roughly "Academy Graduates") 
remained an untapped resource during the Russo-Turkish war. Due to infighting and 
distrust among the general staff of the Ottoman military hierarchy -- mainly fueled by 
Sultan Abdulhamid II himself to maintain control of the throne - "~:ach group or division 
commander saw his unit as his personal fiefdom and paid attention only to his immediate 
area of operations. ,,58 The condition of the Ottoman general staff and military leadership 
without a doubt resulted in the rise of the "Young Turks," who would later take control of 
56 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 175 
57 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 188 
58 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 194 
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the government and overthrow Sultan Abdulhamid II. The new guard of the officer corps 
rivaled that of the old in their training. Therefore, the lack of cooperation among military 
units in the interest of self preservation undoubtedly weakened the effectiveness of the 
Ottoman military. 
It was for this reason, coupled with reasons of poor equipment, fiscal strain and 
minimal time to prepare for war that the Ottomans were left wanting on the Anatolian 
front. In the Southern Caucasus and Eastern Anatolian regions along the Russian border, 
repelling Russian attacks with so little was toilsome and back-breaking work. Ottoman 
forces were stretched thin across a vast border in hellish terrain with little supply. Also, it 
must be mentioned that due to the situation along the Russian border, which was a 
reoccurring theme, the Ottomans also had to combat the problem of Kurdish raiders and 
Armenian partisans. 
Gendarmes, or the policemen of the Ottoman East, had generally been entrusted 
with the protection and security of the people of the Empire in Anatolia. It was in the 
interest of the Ottomans to protect their subjects for the purposes of tax collection.59 
During wartime, however, gendarmes would be called away to supplement the lacking 
forces in the Ottoman military.6o In 1876, the population of the Ottoman Empire was 
around 22 million people. Of these subjects, only about 16 million (12 million in Asia 
and 4 million in Europe) were eligible for military service, due to the fact that the 
59 Justin McCarthy et al. The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah 
Press, 2006), 37 
60 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922, 
(Boston: Darwin Publishers, 1995),42 
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Ottomans only allowed Muslims to serve in the regular army. This meant that the Turks 
were perpetually outnumbered by the Russians 2: 1 at nearly every military engagement.61 
The lack of manpower dedicated to protection made Eastern Anatolia unique. 
Religion had always been a factor in the Ottoman Empire and ultimately determined who 
you were and where you lived rather than any kind of ethnic stratification. In the East, 
the majority of the population was peasantry, attempting to make a living and provide fi)r 
their families in harsh terrain. Affiliations were with one's religion and the same 
conditions remained for the Kurds that also inhabited Eastern Anatolia.62 Most 
importantly, though, was the significance that religious denomination had regarding 
loyalty and alliance. Due to their Christian affiliation with the Russian Orthodoxy and a 
hatred oftheir Muslim overlords, Justin McCarthy argues that "During the 1700's and 
1800' s, Armenian secular and religious officials supported the Russian invasion of the 
Muslim Khanates in the Caucasus and the overthrow of their Muslim rulers," and that at 
the same time, Armenians acted as spies for the Russians. 63 In terms of internal security 
in the East, this is what the Ottomans were faced with among the many other problems 
plaguing the empire by the end of the nineteenth century. 
61 Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, III 
62 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing a/Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922, 
(Boston: Darwin Publishers, \995), 26 
63 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 27 
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64 
Ottoman Counterinsurgency Heritage 
"Similar to the French and British colonial experiences with low-intensity 
conflicts or small wars, the Ottoman officers spent an important percentage of their 
careers fighting against various types of insurgents, social bandits, and tribal warriors. 
Their continuous occupation with counterinsurgency operations left its stamp on the 
identity and performance of these officers. It is nearly impossible to understand the 
political and military developments of the time without paying attention to this 
counterinsurgency heritage. ,,65 
Internal security threats were not unknown in the Ottoman Empire prior to the 
First World War. Quite the opposite is true; they were experts in dealing with insurgency 
64 McCarthy, Justin. Roads and Railroads [map] . Scale not given. In: Justin McCarthy. The 
Armenian Rebellion at Van. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006, p. 168 
65 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 212 
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both politically and militarily. As previously mentioned, the main concern of the Ottoman 
government during the early and mid-nineteenth century was the constant threat of 
Kurdish tribesmen who capitalized on turmoil through raids and highway robbery. The 
Ottoman way had always been able to deal with them either by force with a show of 
military might or with the occasional bribe. The average person was indifferent in the 
East regarding rebellion and the same was true of the Kurds. There was no inherent 
loyalty to one political ideology or another, the focus was mainly on religious affiliations. 
Like most in the Eastern Anatolian region, they just wanted to be left alone.66 According 
to McCarthy, "Those who were a disruptive force were tribal groups, and their loyalties 
were tribal... Iftribes cooperated, it was out of mutual benefit, not ethnic loyalty, for 
which there is no evidence.,,67 
It was no secret that upheaval in the East during wartime meant that the Ottomans 
would have to respond and had the potential to weaken their abilities in battle as a whole. 
That is why Kurdish tribes often capitalized on the chaos during wartime. Raiding and 
theft were commonplace in the East, and the peasantry were often left to fend for 
themselves when Ottoman forces were stretched too thin as they often were. Poor roads 
and rough terrain also slowed the Ottoman response time to crises in the East and by the 
time Ottoman forces would arrive it was often too late. In such situations, it is difficult to 
imagine the emotional backlash of witnessing such atrocities for soldiers. That is 
undoubtedly why the Turkish response was often harsh and exacting upon those believed 
to be responsible. 
66 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 40 
67 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 41 
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The Serbian rebellion of 1875 and the Bulgarian Revolution of 1876 in the West 
is an example of how the Ottomans responded to rebellion in the Balkans, and also an 
example of how such actions can influence others.. The Balkan region was a major source 
of conflict and turmoil as well as a potential bargaining chip in the European balance of 
power. The Serbian rebellion in Bosnia began with refusal to pay Ottoman taxes, leading 
to attacks on officials and eventually Muslim villagers, which of course demanded a 
response from the Ottoman military. The Turks responded with a force to quell the 
rebellion led by Ahmet Muhtar Pasha. This gradually drew attention from the European 
powers and ultimately increased an existing public outcry for the allowance of Bosnian 
autonomy. 
The Bulgarians, capitalizing on the situation in the West, saw an opportunity to 
try for autonomy as well and began a revolution against the Empire in May of 1876. As 
was seen later in the East, both rebellions had outside assistance from Montenegro and 
Serbia who shipped arms and supplies, eventually entering the conflict directly. The 
Serbian and Bulgarian rebels attacked civilians which were met in kind with Turkish 
military force. The Ottomans eventually quelled the rebellions in Bosnia and Bulgaria 
and defeated Serbia and Montenegro.68 This victory inevitably led to the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877-78 and the consummate creation of a Bulgarian state. What became known 
as the "Bulgarian Horrors" of 1876 had unquestionably begun with the slaughter of 
innocent Muslims, though it was largely unreported. 69 
The organizers of the Bulgarian revolution saw an opportunity to take advantage 
of the Turkish vulnerability during the Bosnian revolt. The first villages to face the 
68 Justin McCarthy, Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans, (Istanbul: The Isis 
Press, 2002), 169-170 
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revolutionary tide were Koprivshtitsa, Panagiurishte, and Klisura. 7o Thanks in part to the 
rhetoric of the rebel leader of the Bulgarian revolution, named Georgi Benkovski, about 
1,000 Muslim villagers were killed. Unfortunately, while the regular Turkish army had 
been known for its restraint and obedience, the irregular forces were not. The regular 
Turkish army was tied up with the Bosnian revolt and the Ottoman government feared 
that the rebellion would quickly spread if not crushed immediately. Therefore, in order to 
supplement the lacking troops, the Ottomans armed the indigenous Muslim civilians 
(Ba~i Bozuks) and Circassian irregulars which had been used many times before. These 
irregulars were not known for their restraint, and as custom had dictated for centuries, 
they obeyed the orders of their immediate tribal superiors rather than orders from the 
O '1' 71 ttoman ml 1 tary. 
The Circassians particularly were accustomed to a nomadic style of warfare, 
roaming in search of hospitable terrain and opposing those who opposed them, which 
entailed raids and violent reprisal. Based on their experiences in the Caucasus fighting the 
Russians, they had come to hate Christians for previous acts of violence against their 
people and forcing them from their homeland. 72 Perhaps because of this tainted past 
between the two groups, McCarthy suggests that the Bulgarian insurgents may have been 
aware of the response they would receive from the Circassian irregulars, and that they 
could potentially utilize such violent methods in their favor. McCarthy says that "By 
always burning at least one Circassian village, they insured that th{! Circassians would 
commit atrocities in reprisal. In areas of Bulgaria where the revolution took hold, the 
insurgents committed acts of violence, particularly against Muslim women, with the 
70 Ibid 
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obvious intent of sparking a retaliation.,,73 This is important to remember because the 
Circassians were a source of Ottoman irregular forces. 
The idea of utilizing the suffering of others for the greater good in terms of social 
revolution and autonomy from the Ottoman Empire may seem like a cold and unfeasible 
solution for the Bulgarians. However, the awareness of Western media and Western 
support for their actions against their Muslim oppressors was well known by the 
Bulgarians, recognizing that the eyes of the Christian nations of Europe were upon them. 
One such example is when the English press ran stories about the atrocities of the Turks 
and the kidnapping of Christian girls who were later sold into slavery in Turkish 
harems. 74 There was no truth to the story whatsoever, proven later by European consuls, 
but stories like this had a profound effect on the Western psyche. The Armenians would 
later attribute their revolutionary aims to be that of the Bulgarians by which they would 
draw attention to their struggle, committing atrociities against Muslims with the intent of 
generating Armenian slaughter as a result. The idea being, just as had happened 
previously in the Balkans, Europe would intervene on their behalf and create an 
Armenian nation just as the Bulgarians had received.75 
Muslim suffering did not end with an Ottoman victory over the Bulgarians. The 
result was a Russian invasion in the West and the subsequent murder of countless Muslim 
villagers at the hands of Russian troops and Bulgarian irregulars who sided with Russia. 
As previously stated, the Ottomans were not the only ones to use unconventional tactics 
to achieve military aims. The Russian method consisted of sending their most feared and 
most skilled units in unconventional warfare known as the Cossacks. In order to create a 
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Bulgarian state and to insure Russian supremacy in the region, it had to be Muslim free; a 
task which was entrusted to the Cossack units sent to the region. As McCarthy says, 
"What was needed was a combination of murder and fear that would either kill the 
Muslims outright or cause them to flee from impending murder. To accomplish this, the 
most suitable force in the Russian army was the Cossacks.,,76 
Russian and Bulgarian terror campaigns were meant to frighten, displace and 
eliminate Muslim opposition as well as the Muslim population as a whole. By disarming 
Bulgarian Muslims and turning their weapons over to Bulgarian Christians siding with 
Russia, the object was to destroy their homes so they had nothing to return to when 
hostilities ended. 
"For Example, in the village of Hidibey, Cossacks peacefully took the arms of the 
Turkish villagers and gave them to the Bulgarians, who then killed all but 15 of the 70 
Turkish males of the village, while the Cossacks made sure that none escaped. The 15 
who did escape had fled as soon as the Russians were sighted. In the Buklumluk, the 
Cossacks again took the Turk's weapons and gave them to the Bulgarians. The Cossacks 
'cordoned off the town' to prevent escape. The Bulgarians put all the men in a straw barn 
and all the women and children in houses. The barn and the houses were piled with straw 
and set afire. Those who ran from the buildings were shot by the Bulgarians.,,77 
It is unlikely that there was any real strategic value to such attacks on civilians within the 
mindset of Russian and Bulgarian soldiers. The violence of the 1877-78 war was 
undoubtedly carried over in the collective mindset for the atrocities on both sides during 
the 1876 revolt. Instructions for soldiers on how to incite rage and hatred would have 
been highly unlikely. Rather, the differences were primarily religious and the men who 
faced the horrors of war would not have forgotten what had happened to their families 
and countrymen on both sides of the conflict. Unfortunately, it was primarily the civilians 
who suffered during the war, as they generally do in all wars; the result of which is a 
76 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 68 
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deep, enduring hatred for one's enemy. This is not only remembered by the soldiers of 
the conflict itself, but also a lesson taught to the children who survive to be acted upon in 
the future. 
Preparations for War and the Threat of an Armenian Fifth Column 
"In guerrilla units some individuals have developed strong ideological motives for 
taking up arms. These ideologies take root in two broad areas - politics and religion. The 
individual tends to subordinate his own personality to these ideologies and works 
constantly and solely for the 'cause.' In some resistance fighters, this motive is extremely 
strong.,,7!! 
The lessons that the Turks had learned from the Balkans and the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877 -78 was that a European style time-table was "unsuitable" for future combat 
due to poor communication lines. Also, the immense setbacks suffered in previous wars 
had an even greater impact with regard to losses of equipment, trained leaders and 
experienced battle formations. The loss of the entire Second Army (12 regular infantry 
divisions) in 1914 and most of the First Army meant that focus would have to be on the 
reconstitution of forces rather than training. This made the German mission to assist the 
Turks in restructuring all the more difficult. Wher,e the Turks and Germans could have 
planned for successful offensive operations, had the military been in better standing, they 
now had to focus primarily on reconstitution and hope for the opportunity to seek an 
effective offensive strategy.79 
Keeping this in mind, it also meant that throughout the plarming prior to W orId 
War I, the Young Turks were more concerned with restructuring and diplomacy rather 
than internal security. Erickson argues that "because of the Young Turks' propensity to 
78 Department of the Army. u.s. Army Guerrilla Warfare Handbook, C~ew York: Skyhorse 
Publishing Inc., 2009), 6 
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conduct diplomacy (and their affairs in general) in isolation, that at any given time 
between August and November of 1914, no single individual within the Turkish 
government (including either Sait Halim, the Grand Vizier, or Enver Pa~>a, the Minister of 
War) had a global awareness of the entire diplomatic situation affecting the empire."so 
Perhaps in spite of this, the Turks did not fully realize the potential threat of the 
Armenians in the East. Leading up to the war, the CUP had tried to appease the leading 
Armenian party in the East in order to prevent any kind of popular uprising that might 
threaten the empire during wartime.sl At the begirming of World War I, the concentration 
of Russian forces was in the West fighting the Austrians and Germans. Therefore, in the 
East, in the Caucasus, they only needed to hold out against the Turks until they could be 
spared reinforcements. In the meantime, it was as the Ottomans had done before, the 
Russians now had to defend the lines in the Caucasus. 
Enver Pa!?a realized this and must have seen it as an opportunity to break the 
Russians in the East before the war gained momentum. The old European concept of 
perpetual offensive attack was undoubtedly a factor in his military stratagem. Among his 
grandiose inventions was a debacle known as the "Grand Turanian Offensive." In 
December of 1914, Enver envisioned an opportunity to break the Russians in the East, 
gaining a foothold for the rest of the war in Anatolia. His plan was to attack a railway in 
Sankaml!? which was reinforced with a small Russian force by attacking through the 
mountains and surprising the Russians. The Russians were indeed surprised because, 
given the weather conditions and the difficulty of the assault, the mission was essentially 
suicide. Allen and Muratoff argue that the plan had no real chance of success. The plan 
80 Erickson, Ordered to Dies, 30-31 
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needed more men and more time to prepare but Enver did not want to allow such an 
opportunity to slip away.82 Though, even with an abundance of time and troops, an 
offensive during the winter months was destined to fail. 
The fighting for Sankaml~ throughout January of 1915 resulted in the loss of 
about 50,000 soldiers from the Turkish III Army and most of their artillery. The Russian 
losses were about 16,000 killed and wounded with roughly 12,000 sick - mostly from 
frostbite. 83 Enver tried to cover up the losses at Sankaml~ but the damage was already 
done. The Turkish forces now had to be recovered and the army restructured to fulfill 
regimental requirements. The Turks fortunately had the reserves of men available but 
were severely deficient in weapons and ammunition. The Turks soon caught wind of a 
potential allied invasion of the Dardanelles and their focus began to shift from the East to 
their defenses in the West. 84 
The offensive of Enver Pa~a and subsequent failure at Sarlkaml~ ended any 
chance of an Ottoman offensive against the Russians for at least two years. Though, the 
3rd Army had begun with their overall effective troop strength at about 118,174 in 
December of 1914, only 8,900 remained after Sankaml~.85 The Turks had become 
significantly weakened in the defense of Eastern Anatolia and afforded revolutionary 
Armenian elements to flourish virtually unabated. Anatolia was a core region in the 
defense of the empire and with Ottoman presence lacking in the east, the Russians were 
able to capitalize on faltering Ottoman intelligence and logistics by supporting an already 
hostile Armenian environment in Van. 
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Border Security and Armenian Operations 
Armenian discontent and revolutionary organization can be traced back as early 
as the 1870's. Erickson argues that "While many of the Armenians were loyal and law 
abiding citizens of the empire there had existed for many years subversive Armenian 
societies dedicated to the establishment of an autonomous Armenia.,,86 Two parties in 
particular sowed the seeds of rebellion from within which were known as The Union of 
Salvation (founded in 1872) and the Black Cross Society (founded in 1878). The 
inception of these parties is not as important as their influence on those to follow. They 
were proof that revolutionary organizations were able to function effectively and 
efficiently with minimal Ottoman opposition. They were also proof that with proper 
leadership, rebellion could flourish while preaching violent revolution. Though these two 
groups did not perform revolutionary acts, they were undoubtedly the inspiration for 
those that did. Among the groups to follow were the Armenakan Party (founded 1885), 
the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party (founded in 1887) and the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation (ARF or Dashnaks founded in 1890).87 
Within the Ottoman documents titled Ar$iv Belgeleriyle $iirlerini Faaliyetleri 
1914-1918 CUt I (Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents 1914-1918 Volume 1), 
there are nearly fifty pages of "interviews" conducted from May 4 to May 12, 1915. The 
"interviews", conducted by the Second Police Chief Ahmet LUtfi, were gathered from 
various members of the Hunchak and Dashnak Armenian parties in an attempt to 
understand the leadership hierarchy of the organizations in various districts and villages 
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87 McCarthy, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, 41-43 
-41-
throughout Anatolia. The "interviews" place emphasis on party affiliation and board 
members identities in order to uncover the extent of the Armenian revolutionary network. 
Chief LUtfi asked questions such as: "Who were the members and the administrators of 
your committee? Please tell us their names ... Where did you hide your association's 
weapons, arsenal? ... Where are the documents and the registry books of the 
association?,,88 These "interviews," though they would more likely be categorized as 
interrogations, are at least some indication of the threat posed by the two major Armenian 
revolutionary groups. They also portray the Ottoman Empires' concern with the identities 
of their leaders and the location of their weapons caches. From a counterinsurgency 
perspective, the Ottomans most certainly placed the gathering of intelligence on insurgent 
activity at the top of their list. 
The Dashnaks, who were to become the most influential revolutionary group of 
the insurgency, were socialists in their ideology, much like the Hunchaks. They drew 
inspiration for armed insurrection from Marxism and preached the necessity of arming a 
civilian population in order to achieve "political and economic liberty in Turkish 
Armenia" through such means.89 It was believed by the Armenian revolutionaries that 
through sabotage missions, the execution of goveInment officials and Armenian 
"traitors" who were unsympathetic to their cause, they would gain recognition and 
ultimately autonomy.90 Human suffering was unavoidable and it was necessary to 
mobilize the population in favor of a popular revolt if they were to succeed, not to 
mention generating European support in the process. 
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In discussing the revolution with Dr. Hamlin, founder of Robert College,91 one of 
the revolutionaries told Hamlin that Hunchak bands would "watch their opportunity to 
kill Turks and Kurds, set fire to their villages, and then make their escape into the 
mountains. The enraged Moslems will then rise, and fall upon the defenseless Armenians 
and slaughter them with such barbarity that Russia will intervene in the name of 
humanity and Christian civilization." When Hamlin vehemently opposed the plan and its 
"atrocious" nature, the revolutionary responded: ,,·It appears so to you, no doubt; but we 
Armenians have determined to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian Horrors and 
made the Bulgarians free. She will listen to our cry when it goes up in the shrieks and 
blood of millions of women and children ... we are: desperate, we shall do it. ,,92 
Most likely, the reason for such extreme measures was an attempt to draw others 
to their cause within the community through a demonstration of power. It is also a clear 
example of terrorist strategy in practice. Regarding security in a guerrilla insurgency 
operation: 
"If the resistance movement is strong or gives the impression of being powerful, many 
individuals join out of a feeling of personal safety. Usually, this situation occurs only 
after the resistance movement is well organized and the enemy has been weakened by 
other actions. Others join in order to escape recruitment into the service of the enemy. ,,93 
Security from vengeful Ottoman troops would be powerful motivation if one were 
anticipating reprisal for what others had done. Also, after the Balkan wars, the new 
leadership in the Ottoman military enforced conscription regulations of non-Muslims, 
91 Robert College was perhaps the greatest examplt: of Western Missionary influence in the 
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ideas in the existing elementary schools. Enrollment heavily increased with a wider range of academia such 
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recognizing the danger of a Russian invasion. Among these newly drafted soldiers were 
Armenians who had already been exposed to revolutionary propaganda. Most of these 
recruits can be linked to the high desertion rate in the Ottoman military, as Uyar and 
Erickson argue that "very few of them were willing to fight and risk their lives for the 
sake of the empire. As could be expected, the desertion rates of non-Muslim recruits set 
record highs. They fled or surrendered at the first opportunity, which verified the 
suspicions that Muslim soldiers held towards thern.,,94 Their flight from the Ottoman 
ranks undoubtedly supplied the Armenian weapons caches that would later be discovered 
by the Turks. 
European pressure had perhaps been the most damaging to the Ottoman 
counterinsurgency efforts. Proven effective previously in the Balkans, fighting insurgents 
meant also punishing those responsible for their support.95 This could not be achieved 
while Europeans continued to slant the news in favor of their downtrodden Christian 
Armenian brethren in the East. Ironically enough, McCarthy points out that "The same 
Europeans who complained bitterly whenever the Ottomans imprisoned Armenian rebels 
voiced constant complaints that the Ottomans were not forceful enough in dealing with 
the Kurdish tribes.,,96 Perhaps their sympathies were only limited to members ofa 
congregation. 
Indeed it was no secret that there was Christian support for the Armenian rebel 
cause. According to the Ottoman government documents, there was in fact an order 
issued on May 23, 1915 detailing the procedures in handling "Christians who are allies of 
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the enemy and Muslims who collaborate with them.',97 The order was essentially a call 
for the investigation of Christians suspected of supporting the Armenian revolutionaries 
and for their homes to be searched. Those found to be guilty of supporting the Armenian 
revolutionaries were to be punished by court martial. 
For over a decade prior to World War [the Ottomans had also been forced to 
practice a cautious approach to opposition in the East regarding Kurdish tribes, who had 
formerly been the empire's greatest internal irritation in Eastern Anatolia. Although the 
Kurdish tribes proved an annoyance in the past, their skills in battle and the use of their 
cavalry in irregular formations was an important aspect of Ottoman defense in the region. 
What was ultimately required at the time in the East was a larger police force or 
Gendarmerie, which the Ottomans could not span!. What was used in their place became 
a mistake that the Armenians would not soon forget. Sultan Abdulhamit II created the 
Hamidiye, an irregular Kurdish force intended to solve the military's security problem in 
the East in 1890, a group whose application played a significant role in stopping the 
Armenian rebellion of 1896.98 
Whereas, the Armenian revolutionaries had sometimes cooperated in the 
rebellions of the 1890's, their failures led to splintering among the parties. Specifically, a 
division had developed between the two strongest parties - the Dashnaks and the 
Hunchaks - in which case the responsibility of leadership was ultimately thrust upon the 
Dashnaks.99 Erickson argues that "By 1914, nationalist/revolutionary Armenian societies 
were operating openly in Europe and in Russia and were receiving support from many 
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sources that sought the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire." 100 Ottoman power had 
virtually ended in Europe with their defeat in the Balkan wars and the Armenian 

















At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Armenians had established four 
local committees in Turkey. They had a base in Mu~; propaganda and finance was 
handled through their bases at Trabazon and Erzerurn, while their main headquarters 
were in Van. 102 These bases that they had established acted as the backbone of the 
revolutionary network in crucial areas that would later be able to facilitate a Russian 
101 
invasion. Their propaganda and fundraising efforts were perhaps the most overt, using 
reeducation in local schools, assassination and threats to encourage rich Armenians to 
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donate to the cause. ] 03 McCarthy argues that "Many hated the revolutionaries and would 
have informed on their organization and weapons caches if they had not been afraid for 
their lives.,,]04 
Some Armenian committees, however, were afraid of the growing interest within 
the CUP for "Pan Turanism," which advocated the imposition of the Turkish language 
and culture on the subjects of the empire. The idea was a veracious Turkish nationalist 
pride that was intended to bring the Turkic world together under one banner facing heavy 
opposition from Europe. Erickson says that "In the Spring of 1914 the Turks intercepted 
letters from Armenian committees expressing concern over these developments. Other 
letters sent by the Dashnak [Tashnak] committee requested weapons from the 
Russians.,,]05 The Russians did indeed send weapons and obviously expected Armenian 
acquiescence and assistance in the event of an Anatolian invasion. The Armenian 
committees would have been well aware of this fact, therefore any argument of self-
defense alone would be erroneous. 
In a document from the Turkish archives known as the "Instructions for Personal 
Defense" dated 1910, the Armenian revolutionari~:s illustrate their aims on a village by 
village basis. According to the Ottomans, "tens of thousands" of copies were distributed. 
The document plainly states that there are three types of villages: "1) Those situated 
between other Armenian villages and exclusively inhabited by Armenians; 2) Those 
situated in non-Armenian zones, but nevertheless exclusively inhabited by Armenians; 
and 3) Those inhabited at the same time by Armenians and non-Armenians." Regardless 
of these distinctions, there was no difference in the organization of defense. The 
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document calls for the organization of detachments within each village comprised of two 
sections within each detachment - a "stationary force" and an "active force." In the 
"mixed" villages, the document calls for any enemies which might be the minority in 
relation to Armenians, to be "kept as hostages." In the last section of the document titled 
"To Attack Villages," there are several simple steps which must be adhered to in order to 
create the ideal conditions for attacking and overtaking an "enemy" village. Generalities 
apply in terms of basic guerrilla warfare such as having adequate intelligence, selecting a 
line of retreat, knowing the directional approach of enemy reinforcements should they 
come, attacking at dawn to maximize confusion and finally leaving any horses available 
that are not being used for mounted attacks to transport any casualties. 106 It is the fourth 
point, however, which is particularly interesting and deserves to be quoted directly: 
To attack the village only on three sides, leaving a side free for the besieged to 
make good their escape. (if the village is attacked on all sides, the enemy may fight with 
desperation and compromise victory.) However, on the side left free, a section of 
attackers must conceal themselves in order to pursue the enemy and cause him as much 
damage as possible. Furthermore, the object of leaving a side free is, rather than favor the 
retreat of the enemy, to break up his force of resistance and thus hasten victory; 107 
106 McCarthy, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, 277-278 
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By the spring of 1914, the Armenian revolutionaries had already established 
intricate smuggling lines from Russia. Thanks to the Russian victory in the 1877-78 war 
against the Turks, the Russians had forced the Ottomans back from the previous 
territorial boundaries which ran along the Southern Caucus Mountains. Also, the Russian 
incursion into Northwestern Iran facilitated the perfect means for smuggling weapons 
from Russia directly into Ottoman territory and taking them to Van where the Armenian 
revolutionaries were conspiring with regular Russian forces. The Ottomans, realizing the 
growing threat of an Armenian revolt, patrolled their borders with Russia and Iran to 
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prevent such activities. In response, the Armenians used villagers and spies as their eyes 
and ears to report on troop patrols as well as Kurdish tribal movements. The use of 
Armenian spy networks is confirmed by an Ottoman 3rd Army report to Turkish 
Commanders saying that "It is understood that tht:y (Dashnaks) have set up espionage 
centers in Trabzon, Erzurum, Mu~, Bitlis, Van, Sivas, and in Kayseri in order to inform 
the Russian Army about the movement and state of the Turkish Army."I09 Once across 
the border with the weapons caches, the rebels would disguise themselves as Kurdish 
tribesmen and then village hop the weapons to their intended destination. 110 
Stockpiling continued as the Dashnak party grew stronger in the region bordering 
Russia and Iran. At the edge of the empire in the East, weapons were being gathered and 
Russian forces were training irregular fighters in preparation for a Russian invasion. III 
From December of 1914 to March of 1915, the Armenian bands had begun to form 
themselves into regular units and were softening up the Ottomans for a Russian invasion. 
The rebels would disarm and overwhelm Muslim villages killing men, women and 
children indiscriminately, including Gendarmerie and soldiers. Most of the trouble was in 
Bitlis and Van, but by then, most of the eastern Anatolian countryside was at war and the 
Armenians were under Russian leadership. The war became one of Muslim and 
Armenian conflict, attack and counter attack, violence and revengt: which was sparked by 
Armenians and exacted later by Muslims. I 12 
As early as September of 1914, there had been reports of Armenian decent and 
concerns over the situation in the East as the situation grew more intense. One such report 
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submitted by a police officer investigating the Bozviran village of Pasinler, just 25 miles 
East of Erzerum, wrote in a report: 
I have officially and unofficially had [sic] heard, when I was in Russia, that the 
Russian government was relying heavily on the Armenians for the solution of both the 
eastern provinces problem and for the solution of the minor upheavals in the Caucasus; 
and that the Russian government was trying to pull the Armenians on her side to incite 
upheavals and turmoil in the eastern provinces, Eastern Anatolia, whenever she wanted, 
with the aim of putting the pressure on our government by interfering with our internal 
affairs. I have also heard recently, in Petersburg, that the Russians's [sic] investing so 
much money for the realization of this goal has urged the Annenians living in our 
country to join the Armenians on the other side of the border who were already impelled 
by the Russians's [sic] behavior. Hence, I find the reports presented by the police 
extremely worthy of consideration; moreover, it can be asserted, without doubt, that most 
of the Armenians living in the eastern provinces are full of same [sic] desire and 
feeling. I 13 
The Van Insurgency and the Ottoman Response 
Having realized the full extent of the rebellion in the East, the Ottoman military 
tried to enforce the empire's policies. As previously mentioned, because of the lacking 
Gendarmerie in the region, there remained insufficient manpower to maintain a more 
stringent military code of conduct. The British and Russian offensives had drained nearly 
all regular Turkish forces and allocated them to the front lines, located in Eastern 
Europe. I 14 In April of 1915, Governor Cevat of Van, thinking that he could end the 
rebellion quickly, ordered the arrest of the leading members of the Dashnak party, 
assuming perhaps that he would fragment the revolt by removing its leadership. Ishkan, 
one of the more prominent leaders, left Van and was killed shortly after. Vramian, an 
effective party organizer in America, was arrested and "disappeared" before he reached 
Bitlis while under Ottoman guard. The leader, Aram Manukian, evaded Ottoman forces 
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and escaped. By the end of the month, an all out Armenian insurrection had begun with 
forces cutting telegraph lines and continuing to attack military personnel and civilians. I IS 
McCarthy notes the importance of the fact that Armenian actions in preparation 
for the rebellion at Van had been made as early as October of 1914. This would indicate 
that based on Armenian Defense Council correspondence, the insurgency in Van had 
already been planning and preparing for war against regular Ottoman forces under the 
pretext of provocation. Haig Gossoian (Gassoyan) wrote ofthe Armenian preparations 
for war in Van under the leadership of the Armeni:an Defense Council. Gossoian 
recounted the preparations for a rebellion in Van by issuing a virtual "how to" guide to 
rural insurgency, months before the escalation of conflict in the region. Gossoian wrote: 
In consultation with higher authorities, this council was able to complete essential 
tasks, such as, (a) registration of arms, preparation of arms caches and procurement of 
firearms, (b) registration of men fit for and capable of combat duty, appointment of 
defense leaders, reconditioning of arms, (c) creation of first aid and hospital facilities, and 
procurement of drugs, (d) and a provisioning committee, to be activated as soon as 
demand required. 116 
A document from the Ottoman archives dated September 13,1914, describes the 
information obtained during interrogations from s,everal villages surrounding Erzurum. 
The document describes information that Loris MaIko (Melikov), the son of a Russian 
General, had left for Van to incite uprisings. He had apparently been ordered "not to 
incite an uprising unless the Ottoman Army attacks [sic] Russia." The information 
continues saying that the Armenians of Van were instructed, "should the Ottoman Army 
declares [sic] war upon Russia, as usual, you are to incite an uprising; and if you enroll in 
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the anny, only one-third of you should join, and do not take part in the attacks against 
Russia."] ] 7 
Throughout April, the rebels paved the way for a Russian invasion into eastern 
Anatolia via Van, battling Kurdish irregulars who had been sent to fight. Where the 
Turkish government under the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) had once 
attempted to negotiate with the Annenian revolutionary communities as a preventative 
measure, by the spring those methods proved "ineffective.,,]]8 It was for this reason that 
the Ottoman government had initially attempted to relocate" ... some Annenians who 
posed a threat," to Konya. This initial attempt at £orced relocation in the east, however, 
proved ineffective as well because, according to Ottoman documents, these relocated 
Annenians believed to be a threat, soon joined with other revolutionary bands in the 
region southeast of Aleppo.]]9 
In February of 1915, the Supreme Military Command of the Ottoman government 
circulated a warning to all units that Annenians were fonning bands in various areas. The 
warning also said that Armenians were: 
" ... deserting from the army engaging in banditry, that large amounts of weapons 
and bombs had been found during searches, that these indicated that they were preparing 
for a rebellion and that to counter this threat the following measures were to be 
implemented: Annenian privates will not be employed in the mobile army and in the 
anned services, commanders will resist armed attacks, when necessary, they will declare 
martial law, a vigilant watch will be kept everywhere, searches will not be conducted in 
areas where there is no planned operation and loyal subjects will not be hanned in any 
,,120 
way. 
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As early as December of 1914, the Armenian rebels had been organizing themselves into 
bands along the Iranian border and various other places along the Ottoman border with 
Russia. Their command structure overall was one concentrated "loosely under Russian 
command.,,121 Throughout December, the Armenians approached from Iran with Russian 
support, while irregular bands were engaging in skirmishes and smaller battles with 
Ottoman forces. The main aim of the Armenian rebel bands was to cut the telegraph lines 
in order to prevent the Turks from maintaining effective communications with central 
command. Realizing this, Tahsin Bey, Governor of Erzerum, reported that there was a 
revolt within Van and other areas, and requested reinforcements to be sent. 122 
According to Ottoman documents, on April 24, 1915, a note from the Office of 
the Prime Minister to the Office of the Commandl~r-in-Chiefwas sent detailing the 
appropriate actions to be taken in dealing with the: uprising. The note stipulates that due 
to the activities of the Hunchak and Dashnak committee efforts, regions such as Zeytun, 
Bitlis, Sivas and Van were all posturing for revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The 
document continues saying that, 
With the discovery of bombs, and the Ottoman Armenians' joining with the 
Russian forces by forming voluntary regiments against the Ottoman State, it has become 
evident that these committees ... have gathered .. .in order to incite upheavals in the 
regions behind and to threat [sic] the Ottoman Army at every opportunity through their 
attempts, organizations, and publications. 123 
In light of these allegations, the note details the means by which the government intended 
to quell the rebellion by stating that they intended to close down the Hunchak and 
Dashnak branches in both the capital and in various other provinc(~s, seize any pertinent 
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documents, and arrest the committee leaders and members which had taken part in the 
activities. 124 Due to previous attempts at appeasement, the gendannerie and village police 
would have been well aware of who the members were and would have had no trouble 
identifying those believed to be responsible. 
In March of 1915, most of the eastern Anatolian countryside was in tunnoil and 
the fighting in Van province had intensified. The <coming of spring meant the melting of 
snow and the opening of passes which would have previously hindered the Russian and 
Annenian volunteer advance from the Caucasus. McCarthy argues that perhaps the 
discovery of rebel plans by the Ottoman government may have hastened their pre-war 
planning process. 125 This seems to be true because from a strategic: standpoint, it would 
have made more sense for the Annenians to strike: the city of Van while they were 
preoccupied with defense from a Russian invasion rather than try to take it themselves 
using smaller bands. Rebel attacks had begun with cutting telegraph lines, a tactic which 
they had been using regularly as a guerrilla maneuver to create chaos and prevent 
reinforcements in the region. By March, however, they had grown bolder, attacking 
military installations and gendannes in the Annenian districts ofVan. 126 (:atak Kaza, 
(meaning "district"), was the site of the initial Armenian resistanct::, located in the 
southern area of Van. 
Based on the investigations and interrogations of the gendannerie, and the 
intelligence reports of the Ottoman 3 rd Anny in eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman command 
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was well aware of the situation in Van. A coded report to the Ottoman General 
Headquarters states that, 
As it was presented in the telegrams dated April 20 and 21 (1915), it has been 
decided that, without hurting the feeling of the people who obeyed the state, by making 
use of all the people who can be of help and by calling the men between the ages of 46 
and 50 in military service, all the traitors who took ups arms against the state will be 
punished without showing mercy. If you would approve, I here by [sic] ask the conveying 
above-mentioned point to the Armenian Patriarch, who is charged with the duty of 
educating the people who go astray, and thus inspire the Armenians to obedience and 
loyalty to the state under his own leadership, rather than increasing the effects of the 
erroneous news of the traitor informers. 127 
It is essentially the issuance of a formal warning to be delivered to the Armenian 
community through the Armenian Patriarch. It is a warning meant to avoid the 
punishment of innocent people by proxy to the conflict in eastern Anatolia. A few days 
later (April 24, 1915), according to British Military Records, 1800 Armenians were 
detained by the Ottoman government trom both the Hunchak and Dashnak parties as well 
as various other rebel volunteers. 128 
By May, when a mountain gun unit of the 28th infantry and Mobile Gendarmerie 
battalions from Erzincan and Erzurum did arrive to reinforce the Ottoman forces, it was 
too late; the rebels had already gained a foothold in the region. The reinforcements did, 
however, manage to secure the only escape route toward Bitlis. 129 Fighting continued, 
coordinated with Russian forces and on May 16-1 7, the remaining troops and civilians 
left the city. 130 Aram Manukian was named governor of Van two days after the Russians 
entered the city on May 20, 1915, and the "Van Province Armenian Government" was 
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established. 131 Forces sent to Van to quell the uprising were desperately needed to the 
East of the city to stop a Russian advance from the Caucasus, ultimately allowing rebel 
reinforcements to arrive and forcing the Ottomans out of Van. 132 A media report of the 
Armenian victory at Van was published in the United States in Gochnak, an Armenian 
newspaper, which reported four days later, that only 1,600 Turks still remained in Van 
and that the rest had been expelled or slaughtered. 133 Just one day after the Russians 
entered the City of Van, the Armenian revolutionary committee of Van received a 
telegram from Tsar Nicholas thanking them for their services to Russia. 
The decision to evacuate the Armenian population was issued on May 26 by the 
Ottoman High Command to the Ministry of the Interior. It was suggested that all 
Armenians from the eastern provinces should be e:vacuated and also from similar places 
in Anatolia where Armenians were concentrated. The plan had been to move the 
Armenian communities further into the interior of the empire in order to eradicate 
subversive opposition from key strategic areas of Ottoman control.. With three key points 
in mind regarding Armenian relocation, the Ottoman government made the decision to 
move the Armenians of Anatolia over 240 miles west of Van to an area south of 
Diyarbaklf, near what is now the Syrian border. The three points were as follows: "1. the 
Armenian population should not exceed 10 percent of the tribes and Muslims in the area 
they were being relocated to; 2. Each of the villagl~s which the relocated Armenians 
would establish should not consist of more than 50 houses; and 3. The evacuated 
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Armenians should not be allowed to change their places of abode.",134 This was obviously 
a concerted effort by the Ottoman government to prevent those forcibly relocated 
Armenians from causing any further trouble in their new homes. As stipulated by the 
directions for relocation, any disturbance would not have gone unnoticed. 
As will be seen in the following chapter on the British in South Africa and the 
Americans in the Philippines, there were criminal acts committed in quelling insurgency 
at the military level. Talat Pa~a wrote in his memoirs of this saying that those people who 
did take advantage ofthe situation were both "immoral" and "unscrupulous." In dealing 
out policy among the various political and military branches of the government, the 
Ottoman high command did issue contradicting orders which were perhaps confusing for 
some commanders. On the one hand they were ordered at the political level to "take the 
necessary measures" and at the military level they were ordered to "punish those who 
were responsible" while also being expected to protect the people. 135 The issue of 
Armenian mistreatment in the forced relocations remains a hotly debated subject in 
Anatolian academia. Some claim that the Armenians were intentionally withdrawn from 
the east in an attempt to eradicate them by starvation and exhaustion through their 
grueling trek west, away from the battles. Research of the Ottoman archives, however, 
reveals that Talat Pa~a himself signed orders stating that any officials found neglecting 
their duties and any civilian assailants were to be sent to Committees of Investigation and 
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According to Yusuf Hala~oglu, the Armenian delegation at the Paris Peace talks 
observed that there were as many as 180,000 Amlenian volunteers who fought with the 
Russians from1914 to 1917. Hala~oglu continues saying, "German intelligence 
documents ... state that as of February 1915, the French armed forces included a total of 
12,466 Armenians, of whom 592 were Ottoman Armenians and 12,466 were Armenians 
from other countries.,,137 If claims such as this admitted to Armenian involvement in the 
Russian fight against the Ottoman Empire, then the threat from invasion was very 
substantial indeed. This figure also underestimates the number of Ottoman Armenians by 
not counting irregulars, a number that surely would have been much higher. 
The Ottoman government took care in allowing the Armenians being forcibly 
relocated to bring whatever provisions they needed along with them. As the Armenians 
were relocated from areas of concern such as Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, Aleppo and Adana, 
the Ottomans also issued orders that the relocated villagers were to be counted and 
tracked from their point of origin to the village they were being relocated to.138 This was 
done with the intention of allowing Armenians to return to their homes at war's end, 
otherwise the entire process seems costly and redundant. On securing the civilian 
population, the current U.S. coalition counterinsurgency doctrine states: 
The field manual directs U.S .. forces to make securing the civilian, rather than 
destroying the enemy, their top priority. The civilian population is the center of gravity -
the deciding factor in the struggle. Therefore, civilians must be separated from insurgents 
to insulate them from insurgent pressure and to deny the insurgent 'fish' the cover of the 
civilian 'sea'. B~ doing so, counterinsurgents can militarily isolate, weaken, and defeat 
the insurgents. 13 
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From a strategic standpoint, the relocation of a potential insurgent force was more 
than a difficult decision; it was believed to be a tactical necessity. It would have been 
literally impossible for the Ottomans, or any other military force then and now, to tell an 
insurgent from a civilian at a glance. Age and gender are obvious indications of insurgent 
potential but that designation can only be very generally applied to soldiers. It does not 
account for insurgent support bases that can be found within a civilian population. 
Therefore, in order to remove an imperceptible threat from a sea of indistinguishable 
enemies the only alternative was to drain the sea to remove the threat; a suggestion which 
was apparently at the behest of German advisement. 140 Given the state of the Ottoman 
Empire at the time, their struggle was not one of colliding titans. Theirs was a struggle of 
survival, for the continuity of the empire. It was also a proven measure which had been 
used by their British and American counterparts over a decade earlier which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Halayoglu argues that if one is to accept the estimates of Annenian losses in 
Anatolia, Syria and the Caucasus, then casualties "'would have been around 250,000 to 
300,000." He also argues, however, that most of these deaths were the result of 
epidemics, which in other European countries of the same time period, were also very 
high - a problem which also plagued the Filipino community over a decade earlier, 
following the civilian relocation efforts of American forces. According to Halayoglu's 
calculations, from 1918-1920, Britain had an estimated 167,805 deaths, France had an 
140 Yusuf Hala90 glu, The Story of 19 15: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: 
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estimated 137,173 deaths, and Germany had an estimated 247,983 deaths - all of which 
'd . I d 141 were epl emlC re ate . 
The Turks have received the most criticism for the Armenian death rate during 
this period because of their decision to relocate large numbers of the Armenian 
community for reasons of security. Critics draw their arguments from demographic 
figures which also happen to be in the areas of greatest contention in the east from 
Armenian rebels: Erzurum, Bitlis and Van. According to McCarthy, perhaps the greatest 
argument for the survival of Armenians in this region is also demographic, mainly from 
the number of Erzurum refugees. McCarthy says that, based on the 1897 Russian census 
there were approximately 1,161,909 Armenians in the Caucasus region. 
Due to natural increases in population, by 1914 the population should have been 
around 1,444,000. 142 The men were at war in the Caucasus during World War I so it can 
be assumed that by 1917 the population statistics would have been about the same. Of the 
Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia, the total population from Erzurum, Van and Bitlis in 
1912 was about 485,000. Based on official Russian sources quoted by Richard 
Hovannisian for the Armenian population of the Caucasus in 1917, the total number 
listed was 1,783,000. Subtracting 1,444,000 from 1,783,000 leaves 339,000 - this means 
that the extra 339,000 must have come mostly from Ottoman Anatolia. 143 These refugees 
would have been subject to the cold, dying mostly from starvation and disease. 
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The Turks later regained the city, forcing the Armenians of the region to follow 
the Russians in their retreat expecting asylum. Once the Russians retook the city of Van 
in September of 1915, and defeated the Turks at Kopriikoy in January of 1916, Russian 
dominance in the East was assured. The Armenians believed that they would be allowed 
to return to their homes following the Russian victory in the East, yet the Russians would 
not allow it, putting the entire region under the command of a military governor. 144 It was 
a result that the Armenians did not expect having previously arranged an agreement that 
the area taken in the east by the Russians would become an Armenian nation of the 
Russian Empire. 145 Of the Armenians that remained, many of those who joined forces 
with the Russians had already been a part of the Armenian resistance in the East. 
Ottoman and Russian Armenians, as well as Armenian deserters from the Ottoman army, 
were among them leading the Russian forces moving further west, deeper into Ottoman 
territory on the offensive. 
Salahi Sonyel, wrote about the irregular Armenian groups that operated under 
Russian control and the aftermath of the rebellion at Van. Sonyel wrote: 
The atrocities committed by the Armenian volunteer forces accompanying the 
Russian army were so severe that the Russian commanders themselves were compelled to 
withdraw them from the battle fronts and employ them in the rearguard duties. The 
memoirs of many Russian officers, who served in the East at this time, are full of 
accounts of atrocities committed by these Armenian guerrillas, which were savage even 
by the relatively primitive war standards then observed in such areas. 146 
What is remarkable about this statement is that many of the irregular forces operating 
under Russian command were generally supported by Cossack regiments in irregular 
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operations. The Cossacks were known for their uncompromising brutality and their skill 
and application in unconventional tactics. The fact that Russian officers' testimony of the 
Armenian irregulars brutality was worthy of noting is compelling when considering the 
source. 
McCarthy says, "Of the original 575,000 Armenians in the four provinces, 
339,000 survived when the fighting ended, a mortality rate of 41 percent." Regarding the 
Muslim population it is important to quote him directly: 
"Muslim mortality was statistically worse, although the disaster for both peoples 
was so great that such comparisons have little meaning. Of the 313,000 Muslims who had 
lived in Van before the rebellion and war, only 1119,000 were present at war's end. The 
other 194,000 (62 percent, nearly two-thirds) had died.,,147 
It is obvious that everyone in the region had suffered tremendously on both sides of the 
conflict. Although, the civilians had taken the brunt of the atrocities as they generally do 
in wartime. McCarthy also says that: 
"During the Russian invasion and after Van City had fallen, the Armenians set 
about ridding the province of Muslims. Despite the flight of refugees, a sizable Muslim 
population still remained in the villages. Attacks on Muslim villages had been limited by 
the speed of the Russian and Armenian advance. Once the province had fallen, however, 
the attacks increased and became methodical. They followed a constant pattern: wounded 
and sick Muslim soldiers ... were always among the first to be killed, along with any 
officials or religious leaders. Where adult males were present, the men and young boys 
were taken away and killed. In some villages the women were then raped and sometimes 
killed.,,148 
Aside from the obvious reasons for relocation and the security of the people of the 
region, whether it was Muslims from Armenians or Armenians from Muslim reprisals, 
there are other more technical reasons for their relocation. From a counterinsurgency 
standpoint, it would have been vital to the Ottoman war effort to secure their lines of 
communication. Armenian insurgents recognized this fact which is why among the many 
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guerrilla tactics that they utilized, cutting the Ottoman lines of communication was one of 
the most effective. Sonyel argues that, "the possibility of widespread rebellion behind 
Ottoman lines, and of the danger of the Ottoman army having to fight on a number of 
fronts, with its lines of communication threatened, compelled the Ottoman government, 
on 24 April, to decide to remove the Armenians from vulnerable strategic points where 
they could assist the enemy.,,149 
There was no existing counterinsurgency doctrine in the Ottoman Empire at that 
time; therefore, there are no clear indications of its application in documentary evidence. 
There is, however, enough evidence to suggest that the Ottomans were greatly concerned 
with the protection of supply and communication lines through the use of intelligence and 
the relocation of civilians. Due to the poor roads and lines of communication, it would 
have been essential for the Ottomans to secure these aspects of military defense in eastern 
Anatolia. Without the protection of this region and its strategic vulnerability based on its 
proximity to the Russian border, an all out Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia would 
have been imminent. Indeed, the Russians did invade Anatolia as they had many times 
before. With the help of Armenian insurgents within the Ottoman Empire, the Russian 
invasion of Anatolia during World War I was aided by Armenian insurgents and posed a 
clear threat to the continuity of the Empire. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERIENCE 
PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I 
"On occasion it may be necessary to move or resettle civilians, because such 
action is urgently requiredfor military activities. Under no circumstance do you 
burn civilian property without approval of higher authority. Similarly you do not 
steal from civilians. Failure to obey these rules is a violation of the laws of armed 
conflict and punishable by court-martial. ,,/50 
-United States Marine Corps, Guidebookfor Marines, 2001 
British South Africa and the Anglo-Boer War 
By 1899, at the outset of war with the Boers, the British already had experience 
defending the honor of the Crown in their colonies abroad. The war with the Boers seems 
to have been little more than a combination of repairing a wounded ego and securing 
commercial opportunities in the region, mainly from diamonds and gold. South Africa 
was formerly a Dutch colony until 1795 when a republic replaced Holland's royal 
government, a change which was inspired by the French. England was handed the reins 
of Dutch colonies by the Prince of Orange in the hopes that one day Holland could regain 
its colonial possessions. Until that point, South Africa had been under the control of the 
Dutch East Africa Company for 143 years. Although trouble mounted throughout the 
subsequent decades following British control, it was this transfer of power that fueled the 
fires of discontent for colonial rule within the Boer collective. 
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The Boers, meaning "farmers" (also called Afrikaners), were the multinational 
result of years of migration to the region from a number of European countries. Settlers 
from Holland, France and Germany constituted the majority of the population in the early 
years of the republics. Boers, like most colonial settlers, were rugged, strong willed 
people forged through years of adaptation in harsh territory. Since the beginning of the 
regions' settlement in 1652, the Boers struggled to carve a life for themselves in their 
new African homeland. As is the case with most colonial settlements, the natives, or 
Hottentots (now known as the Kohekohe), of the region were the first to feel the effects 
of European colonialism. European settlement inevitably meant violent clashes between 
the two groups as the settlers pushed further into the interior, conflict, and ultimately 
subjugation of the indigenous Kohekohe by the Boers.15l 
The Boers were, as their name implies, famlers of South Afi·ica. Much like their 
American cousins, the value of slave labor was soon realized, though the source of 
indigenous personnel required to fill the position was readily available. The Kohekohe 
were the primary source of indigenous labor utilized by the Boers after their continued 
conflicts proved that the Boers were not going anywhere. When the British took control 
of the African colony, they saw the Boer's relationship with the natives as a violation of 
humanity. According to Byron Farwell, "British concepts of justice and humanity 
conflicted with those of Britain's truculent white South African subjects. From the 
beginning, her policies were designed to protect what she regarded as the interests of the 
natives and to prevent the abuse of slaves and Hottentot servants, who often lived in a 
'-2 state close to slavery." ~ 
151 Byron Farwell, The Great Anglo-Boer War, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976),4 
152 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 5 
-66-
It was, of course, a noble gesture of royal colonial integrity. For the Boers, 
however, British meddling in African affairs was a gross breach of relative autonomy. 
This was especially infuriating for the Boers considering that the South African economy 
was primarily based on slave labor. 153 Reforms under British law followed over the next 
thirty years (1795-1828) granting more rights to the indigenous Kohekohe and removing 
the shackles of indignity in South African farming culture. The reforms were a 
tremendous source of tension between the Boers and the British, eVt:ntually resulting in 
one notable skirmish which is still remembered to this day as "The Hanging at Slachter's 
Nek." The hanging was a public display of British supremacy when five men were 
executed after a failed revolt of sixty men against the British. The revolt was a reprisal 
for killing a Boer farmer named Bezuidenhout l54 who resisted arrest for failure to 
acknowledge several court summons. Bezuidenhout was hailed a hero and the five men 
executed became martyrs for a cause. 155 Conflict with the British became even more 
likely when, in 1833, slavery was abolished throughout the Empire. 
By December 1, 1834, all of the 39,021 slaves of the South African colony were 
to be emancipated under the new British law. This meant that a great many farms would 
eventually go under due to their dependence on slave labor. Compensation was promised 
by the British government with more that £3 million expected (about $101.9 million 
today), though only about £ 1.2 million was actually provided for reimbursement, which 
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was payable in London. 156 From this, it is evident that based on the rugged nature ofthe 
Boer community being similar to that of the American frontiersman, attempts at colonial 
control and restrictions in unsettled territory would inevitably be met with resistance. It 
would seem that such attempts at control by a distant empire, offering what appeared to 
be very little assistance in return for obedience, would ultimately be met with rebellion. 
Even though the logic behind intervention was sound and the abolishment of slavery a 
utilitarian judgment, the Boers surely could not have been expected to simply accept it. 
Boer Displacement and Relocation 
Tensions finally came to a head in October of 1899, when the Anglo-Boer War 
finally began. Negotiations had failed on numerous occasions and appeals for peace and 
reconciliation went virtually unheard. The British, prior to the declaration of war with the 
Boers, had suffered notably humiliating defeats at Gorbler's Farm 157 and Majuba. 158 It is 
necessary to illustrate the significance of Majuba in order to portray the importance it had 
in the minds of both the British and the Boers leading up to the war.. Farwell writes: 
Majuba, although a small affair, was particularly mortifying for Britain; never 
before in its long history had British arms suffered such a humiliating defeat: a group of 
unsoldiery farm boys had completely routed a British force containing elements of the 
Royal Navy and regulars from some of the most famous regiments in the British army, 
and a force, moreover, that was six times larger thlm that for the Boers and in what ought 
to have been an impregnable position.,,159 
156 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 6 
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be killed. The British refused and the Boers opened fire, killing 56 soldiers, I woman, and wounding 10 I, 
of which 20 later died. 
158 Under cover of darkness, British forces had gained the high groundln order to surprise the 
Boer forces and defeat them with tactical superiority in every way. The result, however, was the 
humiliating defeat of the British force, the death of the unit commander and the retreat and capture of 
countless British soldiers. (See Martin Meredith, Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the 
Making of South Africa, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 95-104 
159 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 19 
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Perhaps the most important incident, however, was the failed coup d'etat in 1895. British 
immigrants from the gold rush and mine owners, including Cecil Rhodes, the prime 
minister of Cape Colony, attempted to overthrow the Boer government in favor of British 
rule. The coup was a complete failure and yet another embarrassing blow to the British 
ego. 160 
The Boers were some of the tinest marksmen in the world, able to judge distance 
easily based on an intimate knowledge of the landscape. This was undoubtedly the result 
of their lifestyle in the Transvaal, an area northeast of their previous homeland before the 
British abolished slavery. The men ofthe Transvaal were rugged just as their forefathers 
were; however, they had developed an even greater sense of independence the further 
they had moved from British control. 161 This surely contributed to their use of guerrilla 
tactics when they fought the British during the war. 
The first year of the war (1899) had not gone according to plan for the Boers. 
Sieges in major cities such as Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley made a British 
victory nearly assured because they had gained territorial superiority over the Boers in 
defense of the Transvaal. Due to their losses in the Transvaal, the Boers began the second 
phase of the war, adopting guerrilla tactics to which they were better suited. Their skills 
with the more advanced, clip fed, Mauser rifle - coupled with their talents as horsemen -
made the Boers a formidable foe during this new phase of warfare. 162 The Boers began to 
160 Kiras,"Irregular Warfare," 247 
161 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 15 
162 The Mauser Rifle was the only piece of equipment which was provided by the Boer 
government to their volunteers. The rifle was far better suited to their needs than the British Lee-Metford 
and Lee-Enfield rifles that had been issued to their regulars. The Mauser was a five round, magazine-fed 
weapon where the Metford and the Enfield were loaded individually. This meant that while the two 
opposing soldiers could fire five rounds at the same speed, a Boer commando had a much greater rate of 
fire than a British soldier with successive shots. Not to mention that the Mauser was far more accurate than 
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utilize their knowledge of the landscape and their affinity for surprise attack to make 
trouble for the British forces. They struck without warning by destroying trains, railways, 
bridges and attacking small convoys and garrisons. They also used sniping to their 
advantage rather than direct conflict with the enemy as they had done the previous 
year. 163 
Alexander Downes wrote that there are two uses of civilian victimization which 
can be used to defeat an insurgency. One is by targeting noncombatants in order to deter 
others from supporting the enemy forces. The other is by severing the civilian support 
base from guerrilla access. Downes argues that, "In this scenario, incumbents either kill 
or relocate large numbers of civilians in order to make it physically impossible for the 
insurgents to obtain food, shelter, recruits, or intelligence from the people.,,164 The 
success of such methods obviously does not justifY their use. What Downes is trying to 
point out is the crucial role that civilians play in determining control, either for the 
insurgency or counterinsurgency. 
It was the British difficulties in combating the Boer guerrillas which led to 
international criticism of their decisions. Because of the Boer's mobility, which was fast 
and agile compared to the slow movements of British troops, it was impossible to keep up 
with them. The British had to be everywhere at once, and the Boers were able to strike 
wherever they pleased at will. Because of this, the British chose to deny the Boers their 
source of support within the civilian community. This meant the burning of farmsteads to 
the British Metford and Enfield rifles. This was mostly the result of poor preparation on the part of the 
British, the Metford and Enfield rifles had been poorly sited before they reached the soldiers. Not to 
mention the fact that the British were unaccustomed to the South African landscape, making the judgment 
of distances very challenging. (see Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 43) 
163 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 324 
164 Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
157-158 
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deny passing commando units' food, the construction of blockhouses and the resettlement 
of the civilian population into camps. 165 
The Boer commanders knew that direct action against the British in the form of 
regular warfare was no longer an option by 1900. Simultaneously, the British realized 
that the Boers were headstrong, not to give in so easily after only one year of fighting the 
Empire. Therefore, it was decided on September 22, 1900 that camps would be 
constructed for the Boers who wished to surrender voluntarily and submit to British 
protection and control within these camps. By December 21, 1900, it was realized that 
there were significant advantages to herding civilians into these camps, both with their 
consent and against their will, in order to combat the guerrilla threat from the Boer 
commandos. Farwell wrote that, "More Boer boys and girls under the age of sixteen died 
in British concentration camps than all the fighting men killed by bullets and shells on 
both sides in the course of the entire war.,,166 
Between December of 1900 and February of 1902, within the fifty or so camps 
that had been constructed, there were around 160,000 Boer inmates total and about 
130,000 Africans. 167 By war's end, of the approximate 160,000 inmates about 27,927 
Boers had died in the camps, mostly attributed to disease and starvation. This left the 
camps with a 17 percent fatality rate of the total number of incarcerated civilians. The 
fatality rate of women or children under the age of sixteen was 94 percent, according to 
Downes figures from Andre Wessels. 168 The technique proved to be effective because by 
removing the civilians from the field of battle, which in the case of the Transvaal and 
165 Kiras, "Irregular Warfare," 248 
166 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 392 
167 Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, 160 
168 Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, 161 
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Cape colony could have been anywhere, meant that the civilians could not support the 
guerrillas, voluntarily or otherwise. British soldiers also burnt farms and killed livestock 
to remove the source of support for the roaming guerrillas; a tactic most famously 
employed by the Russians to prevent the advance of Napoleons army into Russia. 
British forces made use of the extensive blockhouse system in order to choke and 
isolate enemy movements across the open region. The British increased their patrols and 
protection of supply lines, further removing guerrilla potential for attack and a means of 
supply. 169 Strangling the Boers into submission was indeed a well adapted process. 
Perhaps the most effective technique, however, was the use of concentration camps in 
order to deny the guerrillas a crucial support base. The table below illustrates this point 
by recording a rise in the number of civilians interned gradually throughout the final 
phase of the war. 
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171 The Blue Book was a series of documents meant to rebut claims of inhumanity from the 
international community. Each number refers to a document which is meant to be an accurate portrayal of 
the conditions and population figures of the camps throughout the war. 
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The table shows a noticeable increase in the number of interned civilians in the 
British camps. The interned would, as previously stated, have been members of the local 
communities viewed as a threat to British supremacy and control of the region. Coupled 
with the rise in civilian interned there is a noticeable rise in the number of deaths as well. 
This was mainly the result of overcrowding. Overcrowding led to unsanitary conditions 
and ultimately the rapid spread of disease. The conditions of the camps would have been 
the responsibility of the British government, though the result was that they were 
unwilling to provide adequate services and supplies to the civilians within the camps, 
mainly in an effort to save money. 
Lord Kitchener, the man who took control of British armed forces in the second 
phase of the Boer War, admitted in June 1901, that one of the other reasons for creating 
the camps was to coax the Boer commandos into submission by creating a strong desire 
to be with their families. 172 At first, there had been a preferential treatment system 
regarding the issuance of rations to the interned civilians of the camps. The people who 
had voluntarily surrendered to internment were given more food while those who were 
forced received less. According to a prison doctor, the voluntary inmates maintained a 
diet which was "deficient in fats and phosphates," and that those who had been interned 
maintained a diet which was "not consistent with the maintenance of health for any 
lengthened period.,,1?3 
British statistics from Blue Book documents differ with more recent statistics, 
including the large number of African civilians which also died as a result of internment 
172 Godfrey. H. L. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa /899-/907, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1965), 96 
173 Le May, British Supremacy, 97 
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and the scorched earth policy adopted by the British throughout the guerrilla phase of the 
war. The number of civilians killed is obviously a daunting prospect and a stain on 
British history, yet what is important here is the camps application as a measure of 
success in warfare. What is also important to recognize is the effectiveness and success of 
a guerrilla or insurgent fighting force and the extreme measures necessary to overcome 
them. The table below shows the relative application of military forces and their success. 
In the first phase of the Boer war, the Boers utilized conventional tactics with 
unconventional regimental structure with greater manpower and they were quickly 
overwhelmed. When they adopted guerrilla tactics in 1900, however, they were able to 
hold out for another two years against the British, even with a smaller fighting force. 
The numbers speak for themselves showing that, by isolating the civilian 
population from the Boer resistance, the British were able to choke the Boers into 
submission. The British denied the Boers both emotional and strategic support by using 
the civilians as the center of gravity, turning the Boers greatest weapon of resistance 
against them. The will to fight the British would have been strong indeed, though perhaps 
the will to protect ones family and means of survival was stronger. 
TABLE 4.2 Manpower and fatalities ofthe Second Anglo-Boer Warl74 
Manpower at start of war 
Fielded forces, end 1900 
Total manpower employed 
Military fatalities 
Civilian fatalities 
Total war deaths 
















Southeast Asia and the Philippine-American Conflict 
The Philippine-American conflict was fought in a way very similar to how the 
British handled South Africa. Like the Anglo-Boer war, it consisted of two stages against 
an indigenous population seeking the removal of a foreign enemy in favor of gaining 
independence. The battle for the Philippines was first fought against the Spanish Empire 
in 1897, who at the time, maintained control over the archipelago. Later, United States 
involvement followed after the Spanish American war of 1898. At the forefront of the 
rebellion was the secret organization known as the Katipunan society 175, which had 
attempted an insurgency during August of 1896. The failed attempt at insurrection 
resulted in the use of guerrilla tactics. Emilio Aguinaldo became the main leader of the 
movement due to the notoriety he gained fighting the Spanish. Despite their efforts to 
remove the Spanish from the Philippines, Aguinaldo was forced into exile in exchange 
for a promise that the Spanish empire would concede new democratic reforms under their 
continued control of the region. Unfortunately, once Aguinaldo left., the Spanish quickly 
forgot the promises that they had made. 176 
Though Aguinaldo was hailed as a competent organizer regarding the Filipino 
resistance through the Katipunan, he failed to develop as a military strategist and field 
175 The name Katipunan refers to the organization under Andres Bonifacio. Based in Manila, the 
organization stood for the "Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country." It was a 
secret organization, bathed in mystique and societal rituals, compiling "revolutionary rhetoric" and 
nationalist idealism, as well as Tagalog ethnocentrism. The society ultimately sought complete 
independence from Spain, even if it meant armed insurrection. Though the organization had widespread 
success, it was mainly limited to the area of Manila and was plagued by tribal rivalries, also lacking 
sustainable cohesion. This would later be a problem solved by Emilio Aguinaldo. (See Brian M. Linn, The 
u.s. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, i899-i902, [Chapel hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1989],4) 
176 John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-
insurgency Warfare, From the Romans to the Present, (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 132 
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commander. His background in politics and inter-island business dealings had been the 
source of his recognition and initial success within the communities .. His ability to hold 
the irregular forces together to fight the Spanish is what set him apart as a leader. 177 The 
United States had been fighting the Spanish in 1898 at the same time that Filipino 
revolutionaries were attempting to seize control of the islands through insurgency and 
guerrilla tactics. Because of his standing within the community, primarily the Tagalog 
provinces, Aguinaldo was an ideal candidate for the leadership of indigenous troops and 
what was intended to be a smooth governmental transition. Aguinaldo, unaware that the 
transition of leadership was intended to be one from Spanish to American, was supportive 
of American forces taking control of Manila with the assistance and support of his 
irregulars. Although, Aguinaldo and the U.S. (American Consul E. Spencer Pratt) were 
suspicious of one another's motives once victory over the Spanish was attained. 178 
If attempts at understanding this transitional period - from a Filipino-American 
coalition against the Spanish to a Filipino-American conflict - seem difficult, it is 
because they are. Realistic interpretations of the source of conflict are hard to come by. 
The Americans were suspicious of the Filipinos, fearing that they might attempt to take 
control of Manila, and were determined to be independent. Comparatively, Filipinos were 
suspicious of American intentions once they had d~~feated the Spanish in Manila. Both 
assumptions proved to be correct no matter how one views this particular aspect of 
history from 1898-1899 in the Philippines. As Brian Linn argues, "the circumstances 
surrounding the outbreak are still matters of strong dispute. The actual events are still 
unclear, as is the much larger issue of who, if anyone, was responsible for starting the 
\9-20 
177 Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War: 1899-1902, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 
178 Linn, Philippine War, 20-22 
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war.,,179 As is the case in virtually all warfare, and especially in the cases of the 
aforementioned conflicts within this thesis, each side inevitably blames the other for 
being the catalyst to open conflict. 
What is clear, however, is that after the defeat of the Spanish by the United States, 
and the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain relinquished control of its 
territories - most importantly, the Philippines. Two days before the treaty's ratification, 
open conflict erupted between Filipino and American forces in Manila. What would 
follow was a three year war which led more than 4,200 Americans and over 16,000 
Filipino soldiers to their deaths and around 250,000 (if not more) Filipino civilian 
casualties from famine, violence or disease. 180 The United States undoubtedly saw value 
in the acquisition ofthe Philippines in an attempt to control the archipelago and to keep it 
out of German or Japanese hands at all costs. 
Filipino Displacement and Relocation 
Much like the Anglo-Boer war, the first phase was fought within the first year of 
the war in the Philippines. Conventional warfare operations fought by both sides lasted 
from February to November of 1899. The fighting mainly centered in Manila because of 
its strategic importance though the conflict began to shift more toward the north by 
November. Filipino nationalists had successfully assisted the Americans in taking control 
of Manila by isolating Spanish garrisons outside the city and then enveloping Manila. 
179 Linn, Philippine War, 42 
180 Spencer Tucker, The Encyclopedia o/the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars: A 
Political, Social. and Military History, Volume /(ABC-CLIO, 2009), accessed February 10,2013, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=8V3vZxOmHssC&pg=PA478&dq=deaths+in+the+philippine+american 




This position meant that the Americans were in control of Manila Bay after the surrender 
of the Spanish, leaving them also enveloped by the surrounding Filipino national army. 181 
For months the two armies prepared for a potential clash and in February, the 8th corps of 
the U.S. Army made short work of the Filipino Army of Liberation. Aguinaldo and his 
Army of Liberation theoretically should have been able to defeat the American forces 
simply by way of sheer numbers and civilian population support, allowing the Army of 
Liberation to attack the Americans at both the front and the rear of their line of defense, 
striking from within. The Army of Liberation and its military leadership had been ill 
prepared for an assault and were constantly plagued by poor, short-sighted decision 
making. 182 
The losses in Manila and the mounting losses throughout the year until November 
forced the Filipino insurgency further into the interior of the country. It also pressed the 
issue that they were not suited to fight in open conventional conflict with American 
forces. The adoption of guerrilla tactics was a decision made by Aguinaldo after the 
November raid of Tarlac, Aguinaldo's headquarters north of Manila. General MacArthur 
moved toward Aguinaldo's position and took Tarlac without a fight. This has generally 
been attributed to the arrival of Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton's amphibious landing at San 
Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf and his 2,500 reinforcement troops that he brought with 
him. 183 The geographic location of San Fabian and Wheaton's reinforcements created a 
choke point north of Manila as Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton swept Northeast and 
181 Linn, Philippine War, 42-44 
182 Linn, Philippine War, 62 
183 Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and 
Fall of America's Imperial Dream, (New York: New American Library, 2012), 130 
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MacArthur kept the Filipinos in central Luzon pinned. 184 Aguinaldo and his forces had no 
choice but to flee and hope to fight another day. Aguinaldo's main concern had been to 
escape, which he managed to do. Following this move by American forces and the 
continued defeats over the last nine months of the Filipino forces, Aguinaldo decided that 
it was time for a change in strategy. It was clear that the Filipino forces were simply not 
prepared to fight a conventional war. Therefore, Aguinaldo decreed that from then on, 
they would utilize their familiarity with the terrain and the local population to blend into 
their surroundings and continue the fight with irregular tactics, no longer wearing 
uniforms and fighting a war "without fronts or fixed positions.,,185 
Military strategy of the United States during the insurgency or guerrilla phase of 
the war had been shaped from experiences in the Civil War and the Indian Campaigns. 
Under General Order No. 100, the Regular Army utilized the irregular tactics that had 
proven useful in the past and were widely accepted. The Order essentially allowed for the 
pacification of irregular forces by separating them from the civilian population, the 
separation of noncombatants from armed opponents. Those who continued to resist 
American forces risked imprisonment, forced removal from their property, or having 
their homes and their crops burned or destroyed. 186 The move was intended to restore 
order and to ensure that violence would be contained and eventually eradicated. 
It is important to mention that, due to the 1899 Army Act, American forces in the 
Philippines consisted of two military organizations; Army Regular forces and the 
volunteer forces made up of state militias from all of the United States. Army Regulars 
184 Brian Linn, The u.s. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 14 
185 Jones, Honor in the Dust, 130-131 
186 Linn, Philippine War, 9 
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were far more disciplined than the irregular volunteers and had a better understanding of 
military tactics and unit cohesion. The volunteer forces had courage and enthusiasm, yet 
at times, they proved difficult to control due to restructuring of Army units under 
different commanders than they had grown accustomed to within their own militia 
structures back home. 187 
The American forces fought various skirmishes against the guerrillas throughout 
1900, though the plan to pacify the civilian population was not instituted until after 
McKinley's election in November of 1900. Because of the rapid success in the Spanish-
American War and the victory over the Liberation Army in Manila, it was believed 
victory in the Philippines would be achieved much sooner than it was progressing in the 
winter of 1900. Public pressure in the United States and the fear that "the guerrilla war 
would become a chronic problem if pacification were not forthcoming," led to the 
decision to increase military pressure on guerrilla D)rCes. By 1900, the conditions were 
right for an offensive against the insurgency in the Philippines. American troop strength 
was approaching 70,000, the monsoon season was at its end, allowing greater ease of 
troop movement, and American forces were well supplied to begin a campaign of 
pacification. 188 
One aspect of the U.S. Military counterinsurgency approach during this period is 
worthy of note. In December of 1900, the Army organized a Division of Military 
Information. The purpose of this organization was to collect any peltinent intelligence 
that might be useful to the military in countering guerrilla forces. The Division had been 
187 Linn, Philippine War, 9-10 
188 John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-
1902, (Westport: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973),204-205 
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instructed to "pay agents 'liberally' and give them as much protection as possible.,,189 In 
Manila alone, special attention was given to the eradication of revolutionary 
organizations and between November 1, 1900 and February 1, 1901, agents arrested 
around 600 people, 250 of which were officers of the insurgency. 190 Contrary to what 
some might consider an all out insurgency in the region, the opposite is true. According 
to Linn, "in thirty-four of the seventy-seven provinces (44 percent) the total of military 
operations between United States troops and supporters of the Philippine Republic was 
zero; that is, in nearly half of the provinces there was no fighting at a11.,,191 What this 
means is that there was not an overwhelming amount of support for the Filipino 
insurgency, yet they still proved successful against American forces until the U.S. 
decided it was time to pursue a hard line toward th(;~ insurgency and institute the use of 
spies in major cities and greater pacification efforts. 
(The institution of secret organizations within the indigenous community as a 
counterinsurgency technique was also a tactic utilized by the Ottomans throughout World 
War I. The organization known as the Te~kilat-l Mahsusa [Special Organization] was the 
Special Forces of Enver Pa~a. Their purpose was "to cope with what he regarded as twin 
threats to security of the Ottoman state, namely, indigenous separatist movements and 
European aggression."I92 Little is known about the organization due to its clandestine 
nature as well as virtually no scholarship on the organization existing. Philip Stoddard 
wrote that what is known about the Te~kilat-l Mahsusa is; it was a secretive and 
disreputable group engaged in guerrilla warfare, espionage, counter-espionage and 
189 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 209 
190 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 208-209 
191 Linn, Philippine War, 185 
192 Philip H. Stoddard. "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary 
Study of the Te~kilat-I Mahsusa" (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 1963), 1 
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propaganda; the group was not "the proper concern of any department of government" 
except for the Ministry of War; and that it was "libt~rally" awarded funding that was 
"outside the regular war budget." 193 What makes the institution of this organization so 
fascinating and ultimately relevant to the study of Ottoman counterinsurgency is their 
creation in general. According to Stoddard's research, sources point to August 5, 1914, as 
the day the organization was given an official name. He stipulates, however, that Cemal 
Pa~a - Commander of Ottoman forces in Egypt and one of the three leaders of the Empire 
- referred to the Te~kilat-l Mahsusa in his memoirs as early as 1913. 194 If the information 
based on interviews with former members is true then it indicates that internal security of 
the Empire from external as well as internal indigenous threats was much greater than 
many realize). 
In 1901, the U.S. truly began placing noticeable pressure on the insurgency and 
it was clear that it would not last much longer. The Army utilized local native volunteers 
to hunt down the guerrillas in the field while the Federal party sought to negotiate their 
surrender. The Army began arresting and deporting the principalia (noble class) that 
supported the insurgency in a show of force that was meant to be an example to others 
what the consequences would be if warfare continued. Army units isolated the 
surrounding mountainous borders to prevent insurgent escape. The Military formed 
commissions which tried and executed insurgent captives and sanctioned the destruction 
of crops and the isolation of civilian populations to remove their potential to support the 
. 195 
msurgency. 
193 Stoddard, "Te~kilat-l Mahsusa." 49 
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195 Linn, Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 25 
-82-
American forces were growing weary of gm~rrilla warfare by September 1901, 
and the attack on Balangiga was the lynch pin which released the fury of American 
military reprisal. Balangiga, Samar was the site of a combined attack by guerrillas and 
townspeople which left 48 Americans dead and 74 wounded. The result is an indication 
of American resolve to end the war in the Philippines. Linn writes that, 
Infuriated by the 'massacre' at Balangiga, frustrated by continued warfare, and 
outraged at guerrilla terrorism, the Americans ended the Philippine war with vindictive 
ruthlessness. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, the commander of the Sixth Separate Brigade, 
ordered one of his officers to tum Samar into a 'howling wilderness' and to shoot any 
males over age ten. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, commanding the Third Separate Brigade 
in southern Luzon, concentrated most of the populace into guarded zones, where many 
died of malnutrition and sickness. 196 
The result was the further suffering of civilians, directly through military action or 
indirectly by the destruction of farms and the loss of livestock. By June of 1902, resulting 
from the two campaigns under Smith and Bell, the last of the insurgency surrendered. 
Smith was eventually court-martialed and five officers were tried for war crimes. 197 
Bell's campaign, however, has since been described as "a masterpiece of counter-
guerrilla warfare.,,198 
Just as conditions had been in the Anglo-Boer war, camps were, " ... overcrowded 
and suffered from food shortages and sanitation that ranged from poor to appalling.,,199 
According to Linn, Glen A. May has made the mos.t thorough study of this time period 
regarding morality and has concluded that due to estimates of malnutrition, substandard 
196 Linn, Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 26-27 
197 Linn, Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War. 27 
198 Robert D. Ramsey III, "A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the 
Philippines, 1901-1902," Long War Studies Occasional Paper 25 (2007): 12, accessed January 29, 2013, 
htlp://usacac.army.mil!cac2/cgsc/carlidownloadicsipubs/ramseyop25.pdf 
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sanitation, and disease " ... may have cost as many as 11,000 Filipino lives and made the 
population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902.,,200 Stuart Miller wrote of Bell's 
population relocation efforts saying, "The entire population outside of the major cities in 
Batangas was herded into concentration camps, which were bordered by what Bell called 
'dead lines.' Everything outside of the camps was systematically destroyed - humans, 
crops, food stores, domestic animals, houses, and boats.,,201 
Unfortunately, accurate numbers from this period of history are very hard to come 
by. Civilian death estimates in the Philippines have been argued as both inflated and 
understated, with the most conservative estimates at 200,000 and the most extreme 
estimates at 700,000.202 John Gates argues, however, that due to the public distaste for the 
war and sensational journalism, as well as statistical manipulation, accurate numbers 
have been overshadowed by sloppy scholarship.203 In fact, Gates argues that the majority 
of the civilian casualties were the result of a cholera epidemic which infected the islands 
towards the end of the war and continued after it ended. Gates used the projected 
population statistics of Filipino birth rates and contrasted those numbers with the 1903 
census estimates taken by the Filipino government and concluded that a more accurate 
number of civilian casualties was actually around 234,000.204 
Gates attributes the majority of these deaths. to cholera and various sources 
consistently place the number of casualties around 200,000 deaths. This illustrates that 
regardless of the reasons for civilian collateral resulting from war, the result is the same; 
200 Linn, Counterinsurgenc-y in the Philippine War, 1155 
201 Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-
1903, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 208 
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noncombatants are killed in great numbers especially in counterinsurgency operations. It 
must also be considered that irregular operations tend to be more costly for the invading 
or foreign power. It cost the United States an incredible $400 million (around $10 trillion 
today) to defeat the Filipino insurgents, which was much more than it had cost to defeat 
Spain a few years earlier.2os 
Like the efforts of the Anglo-Boer War and the Americans in the Philippines, the 
Turks were faced with the same issues in relocating large numbers of the population. The 
logistical difficulties in moving such large numbers of people inevitably results in the 
catastrophic loss of life, mainly from disease and starvation. Civilian casualties in 
warfare, no matter the scale, though extremely unfortunate, are inevitable. Downes 
argued that: 
States seek to win the wars they fight quickly and in an economical fashion. 
States rarely begin wars with a strategy predicated on targeting civilians .. .In relatively 
short, bloodless wars ... civilian victimization is rare, but when anned conflicts devolve 
into protracted wars of attrition, the probability mounts that noncombatants will be 
victimized as a means to reduce costs and avoid defeat. 206 
Downes also argued that, based on data compiled involving all interstate wars between 
1816 and 2003, the evidence showed that, "Wars of attrition - conflicts characterized by 
static, positional warfare, sieges, or counterinsurgency - and wars in which a belligerent 
intended to conquer and annex its neighbor's land ~!ach significantly increased the 
likelihood of civilian victimization and the number of civilian casualties a state 
inflicted.,,207 Though the conflicts covered in this thesis are limited to the Turks, the 
205 Robert C. Doyle, The Enemy in Our Hands: America's Treatment of Enemy Prisoners of War 
from the Revolution to the War on Terror, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 146 
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British and Americans, spanning just over a decade of conflict, this argument further 




"Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man's warfare ~ it is the graduate level of 
.. 208 
war. 
-Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005 
The Ottomans did not invent irregular warfare and certainly were not the only 
great power to encounter insurgency and partisan warfare before or since the First World 
War. Irregular warfare by definition simply implies. that the forces used for fighting are 
not part of a regular army, making them irregulars. Though, it has often been coupled 
with the use of unconventional methods making it more ofa blanket term to insinuate the 
use of unregimented tactics. Irregular warfare is particularly complex because it allows 
the combatants, who have been referred to as partisans, guerrillas, insurgents and even 
terrorists, to blend into their surroundings by not dawning the military distinction of a 
uniform. Therefore, they are incredibly difficult to identify, making them equally difficult 
to isolate from noncombatants. 
This also means that whoever the counterinsurgency units may be, they must find 
a way to combat the threat of unconventional warfare. In some cases, adopting their 
tactics is a tempting prospect. The United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
illustrates this by saying: 
208 The u.s. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 1 
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"Counterinsurgency can bring out the worst in the best regular armies. Even when 
COIN [Counterinsurgency] forces explicitly reject insurgent tactics, they often come to 
imitate them. In particular, the insurgents' invisibility often tempts counterinsurgents to 
erase the all-important distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. Historically, 
this has sometimes been a preferred strategy.,,209 
In the case of the uniform distinction, however, even if counterinsurgents were to 
disregard the uniform, they would still be inevitably faced with differences in religion, 
skin color, language, cultural understanding, territorial awareness and familiarity, and the 
list goes on and on. Losing the uniform and fighting in civilian clothing is not a 
wholesale solution. It is a band-aid over a gaping wound. That is to say, there are 
numerous elements to counterinsurgency operations, like warfare in general, which can 
be applied to aid a much larger operation. 
It goes without saying that the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century 
continues to shift from large scale conflict to small scale hit and run tactics. The way that 
great powers worldwide deal with this type of wartlre has been carefully crafted through 
years of experience - trial and error. Perhaps the greatest challenge in counterinsurgency 
comes from this non military distinction - the stripping away of regular military 
identification. In such cases, partisans, guerrillas, irregulars or insurgents, rely heavily 
upon a civilian population in order to supplement their needs as a fighting force. The 
Cuban revolution of 1953-1959 is an example of this. In this case, guerrillas fought 
regular Cuban forces using "Hit and Run" tactics, which essentially entailed attacking the 
enemy and then dissolving back into the forests and mountains that had become their 
home as well as their battle ground. Such tactics help in preserving the sustainability of a 
109 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, xxxvii 
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smaller force fighting a larger one. As Che Guevara, field doctor and commander of 
guerrilla forces in Cuba said: 
"Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush, again hit and run, and thus repeatedly, without 
giving any rest to the enemy. There is in all this, it would appear, a negative quality, an 
attitude of retreat, of avoiding frontal fights. However, this is consequent upon the 
general strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is the same in its ultimate end as is any 
warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy.,,210 
Irregular units not only employ unconventional tactics but they often have the 
support of the local people. Another of the more famous revolutionary partisans is Mao 
Tse Tung, leader of the Chinese Revolution and later Chairman of the People's Republic 
of China. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's, Mao fought using guerrilla tactics with the 
intention of ultimately forming a larger regular force in order to return China to the 
people, famously saying that, "The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy 
the enemy.,,211 Popular support of the people was an absolute necessity to Mao's guerrilla 
campaign just as it was with Che Guevara and Fidel Castro's revolutionary war in Cuba. 
It is easy to condemn the actions of regular forces for using extreme measures in 
the heat of irregular warfare. The reason for this is simply the heart-wrenching results of 
civilian involvement, regardless of which side they support. From a fundamental 
standpoint, however, it is extremely difficult to fight a multi-front war, regardless of its 
scale. When your enemy is invisible the majority of the time, and not only surrounding 
your lines of defense but has a presence within them as well, living among you and your 
troops, the potential for chaos and retribution begins to mount in any theater. 
Such was the case in Manila following the end of the Spanish American war and 
the immediate beginning of another with the Filipino irregulars who had previously been 
210 Emesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (U.S.:BN Publishing, 20()?), 11 
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helping the Americans. Aguinaldo's decision to favor irregular tactics for the remainder 
of the war was a decision made out of necessity. in the interest of self preservation and 
continuing the fight against their foreign occupiers. Aguinaldo made it virtually 
impossible for American forces to discern combatant from noncombatant, apart from the 
obvious gender and age restrictions in most cases. Because of this, the decision to begin 
utilizing camps as a means of isolation and as a counterinsurgency tactic is not hard to 
understand. In the case of the Philippines, especially, the need for containing threats and 
controlling the pace and location of battles would have been crucial. Due to its 
geographic location, unique in character, the island format for warfare poses new 
challenges to the counterinsurgent approach. One challenge would have been the 
immediacy of establishing security. David Lonsdale wrote: 
Modem COIN [counterinsurgency] practice ... tends to be regarded less as a form 
of war and more as a security challenge, with popularity and legitimacy being the key 
means to achieving the desirable end state. While there is certainly value in the hearts-
and-minds aspects of COIN doctrine, we must never lose sight of the fact that COIN is 
still a form of war. In fact, an essential ingredient of COIN is inflicting serious military 
setback on the insurgents. This not only restricts their ability to undermine security in the 
contested territory, it also promotes a sense of authority for the local government and 
their allies.212 
If Lonsdale is correct in this argument, then dealing critical military blows to the 
insurgent forces and displaying authority is essential in combating insurgency. What 
better way to do both than to remove the insurgent's source of support by placing their 
support base in isolation camps. The insurgents are then more easily separated from the 
civilians and counterinsurgents have demonstrated to the local population and the 
government that they are capable of handling the situation, by force if necessary. 
m Lonsdale, "Strategy," 39 
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When the enemy is capable of not only receiving support from a local population 
for their cause, but also able to hide amongst them without being immediately detected, it 
is nearly impossible to discern friend from foe, combatant from noncombatant. Therefore, 
the most logical explanation in the early nineteenth century was to remove the potential 
threat from theaters of war to a location that can be guarded and monitored in order to 
minimize the risk of being attacked from within. The human element in irregular warfare 
and counterinsurgency tactics is ultimately one of the most important aspects when 
considering the possibilities of success. This was true in the United States following the 
attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The result of which was the internment of 
over 100,000 Japanese Americans out of fear that the same internal security threat which 
was responsible for the attacks could potentially attack again from within the United 
States.213 
As it has been demonstrated, the relocation of civilians was also a tactic employed 
by the British during the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902. In this case, prior to the 
insurgency in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the British had employed the 
technique in an attempt to preserve human life and prevent guerrilla support. What 
followed were the internment of approximately 250,000 people, and the "recorded" 
deaths of about 45,000.214 The British clearly believed that in order to win, the human 
element must be removed from the equation because of its potential to either support the 
insurgents or to join their ranks. This mentality has also been demonstrated by the use of 
213 Max Everest-Phillips, "The Pre-War Fear of Japanese Espionage: Its Impact and Legacy", 
Journal o/Contemporary History 42 (2007): 249, accessed April 20, 2012, 
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relocation and internment by the Americans in the Philippines from 1899-1902, resulting 
in the internment of an unknown number of people and the reported deaths of about 
200,000 civilians? I 5 
The Ottoman officers (Mekteblis or New Guard), utilized their skills in foreign 
language by following the developments of other nations prior to World War I - nations 
such as the United States and Great Britain. They looked to British counterinsurgency 
during the Boer war for inspiration and ultimately applied such tactics to their encounters 
with irregular warfare and counterinsurgency?16 They had come to be a product of 
Prussian military strategy because of the Turkish governments' alignment with Germany 
in World War I. 
While the British and the Americans chose to utilize camps to secure civilians and 
quell insurgency, the Turks used forced relocations .. The Ottoman Empire was in dire 
straits, suffering from fiscal concerns, internal security threats, supply difficulties for 
their troops and pressure from every angle by the entente powers. Creating camps would 
have simply not been an option. Building camps for civilian relocation would have cost 
time and money, two things that the Turks simply could not afford. There was also the 
threat of a Russian invasion from the east; therefore, choosing a location that would have 
remained secure would have been difficult in the event of a Russian push west into the 
empire. There was also certain immediacy to the situation in the east and great concern 
for solving the problem as quickly as possible. Unlike the British and Americans, the 
Ottoman counterinsurgency efforts were hindered by foreign support for the insurgents. 
Though the combat and strategy was fought in similar manner, the Filipinos and the 
215 Doyle, Enemy in Our Hands, 146-147 
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Boers were not backed by active support from a major power. Incidentally, the Armenian 
revolutionaries were backed by Russia, who providl~d weapons, funding, training and 
leadership. 
Much like the Ottomans, the Americans and the British used irregular units to 
handle their insurgency problems. Though, their reasons for this differ. The British 
decision to use irregular forces was because the British army preferred to use their regular 
forces elsewhere and saw the Boer rebellion as little more than a skirmish. Tradition 
would have dictated that the British used their many Indian irregulars to fight the Boers, 
however, it was decided that this particular conflict should be one comprised of and 
fought by white men, with two thirds of the army made up of poor Irish and Scots. Even 
the Boers warned the local Africans not to get invollved in the conflict.217 
The Americans on the other hand, had maintained the regular army as more of a 
peace keeping force than a blunt instrument of war in 1899, which had been limited by 
congress to 28,000 soldiers. The irregular state militias, however, numbered around 
115,000 and were used for the majority of Americas fighting. 218 These were the men who 
had been called upon to defend America's territories and honor in the Philippines; men 
eager to prove their worth after hearing countless tales of honor and glory in the Civil 
War fought by their fathers and grandfathers. As I have previously mentioned, regardless 
of their enthusiasm, these men ranged from experie:nced battle formations to 
inexperienced civilians eager to do their part. 
The Ottomans, however, were faced with very distinct challenges which separated 
them from the British and the Americans. In the Turks case, their insurgency was one 
217 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 40 
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fought on their own soil in the eastern part of the empire. Though the trouble was a long 
way from the capital, the threat was still one bred from within by the revolutionary 
Armenian community. The Turks, like the British and Americans, relied heavily upon 
their irregular forces to fight in the east. The reason for this, however, is because they 
were already entangled in the First World War with the British, Russians and French. The 
Turks had no choice but to utilize irregular units beeause their regular units could not be 
spared. They were being used to support the Germans at the front in Europe. Therefore, 
the use of irregulars by the Turks was out of necessity and not by choice. 
These examples are at least some indication of the tactics used prior to World War 
I during times of internal security threats. They also indicate that some techniques have 
not changed, not to mention the fact that such techniques were and have been regularly 
applied by Western powers since the First World War. The significance of this is that 
while Western observers have condemned the Ottomans for using internment and civilian 
displacement, the Ottomans were in fact drawing inspiration from their former British 
allies. It is also significant because while contemporary and modem Western scholars 
may argue that the Turks were deliberately attempting to annihilate an ethnic minority in 
the region, those scholars frequently overlook the f:act that their own governments once 
recognized such techniques as an unfortunate necessity in the early twentieth century. 
Robert Taber wrote, "Can Guerrilla tactics be employed successfully against 
Guerrillas? The answer is negative .. .Indian fighters do not become Indians by taking 
scalps. A spotted jungle suit does not make a United States Marine a Guerrilla.,,219 The 
devil is in the details, as is often the case in warfare. Isolating a civilian population from 
219 Taber, War a/the Flea, 8 
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the possibility of insurgent control through coercion or willful cooperation has become 
essential in fighting an irregular war. John McCuen wrote: 
Since security of the population will be the first objective of the civic action teams 
and isolation of the guerrillas a primary objective of the territorial forces, both these 
counter-revolutionary authorities probably will tind that regroupment of the population is 
necessary to accomplish their objectives. Of course, regroupment largely will involve the 
resettlement of outlying populations which the British successfully employed in 
Malaya.no 
There has been a noticeable shift in the way that wars have been fought since the end of 
World War II. That shift has been one from large scale regular warfare to smaller scale 
irregular tactics. It is cheaper, more unpredictable, has the potential for foreign support in 
varying degrees, can last for decades and therefore, is more difficult to eradicate. 
Erickson argues that Abdulhamid II and his advisors were aware of the possibility 
that European forces might intervene on behalf of the Christian separatists in the Balkans 
during the 1877-78 wars - where the Ottomans began to shape their understanding of 
counterinsurgency prior to World War I and the rebellion at Van. Even with their military 
experiences against IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization)221 in the 
Balkans, the Ottoman hierarchy had consistently passed the responsibility of dealing with 
counterinsurgency down the chain of command. The system, which was still one of 
loyalty and patron-client relations under Sultan Abdulhamid II, meant that rather than 
deal with the problem themselves the unit commanders would often pass the task of 
220 John J. McCuen, The Art o/Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o/Counter-Insurgency, 
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 231 
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dealing with counterinsurgency to their officers in the field. 222 As a result, it was the 
young officers who had studied European techniques that developed a coherent but 
unofficial military doctrine for counterinsurgency. Up until the 1890's, there had been no 
official or uniform guide for counterinsurgency. It was a system of trial and error applied 
on the front lines. The result was successful according to Uyar and Erickson saying that, 
"These unofficial counterinsurgency strategies, tactics, and techniques eventually paid 
off, and most of the Komitaci [rebel] groups were crushed and lost ground after 1904.,,223 
Therefore, the Ottoman officer corps, responsible for counterinsurgency decisions, had 
used what they learned from the West in the Balkans, and in turn, applied their 
experiences from the Balkans to Anatolia. 
Compiling all of the relative figures from each military entanglement for the 
British, the Americans and the Ottomans in each specific case has been examined in this 
thesis. That is, the relative numbers of government forces and insurgent casualties versus 
the relative number of civilian casualties of war. What these numbers are meant to 
illustrate is that while the West condemns the Turks for their counterinsurgency efforts of 
the First World War, the British and Americans themselves had utilized the same tactics 
little more than a decade earlier. 
The Armenian fifth column posed an eminent threat to Ottoman security and the 
Ottoman government acted accordingly by removing the threat for the sake of the empire. 
The Turks were concerned with saving the lives of their Muslim subjects from rebel 
massacres as well as protecting their investment in the region as a source of tax revenue 
and internal security from potential threats, mainly Russia. Unlike the Americans in the 
222 Uyar and Erickson, A ,Io"filitary History a/the Ottomans, 213 
223 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History a/the Ottomans, 215-216 
Philippines and the British in South Africa, the Ottomans stood to lose many more 
civilians because the war was being waged on their own soil. The fact that they managed 
to survive in the midst of the greatest war ever fought in history up to that point, fighting 
an insurgency from within and major powers on two fronts is astounding. 
With regard to the importance of the rural population in both insurgent and 
counterinsurgent operations, the Small Wars Manual states that, 
The majority of the people, especially in the rural districts, dislike and fear 
revolutions, which often involve forced military service for themselves and the 
destruction of their livestock and their farm produce. However, they may be so 
accustomed to misgovernment and exploitation that concerted efforts to check disorderly 
tendencies of certain leaders never occurs to them. It is this mass ignorance and 
indifference rather than any disposition to turbulence in the nation as a whole, which has 
prevented the establishment of stable government in many cases.224 
This is a valid statement with regard to rural populations and their malleability. However, 
this manual was meant to be a guide to winning small wars through counterinsurgency 
efforts and is meant to illustrate the importance of civilian support. What this statement 
also indicates, however, is the malleability of the indigenous forces in the other direction, 
in support of the insurgents. 




"If there is anything new about guerrilla war -- of which Sun Tzu surprisingly 
anticipates by two thousand years virtually all questions of a military nature -
it is only in its modern political application. To put it another way, the 
specifically modern aspect of guerrilla warfare is in its use as a tool of 
political revolution - the single sure method by which an unarmed population 
can overcome mechanized armies, or, fililing to overcome them, can stalemate 
them and make them irrelevant. ,,225 
-Robert Taber, War of the Flea, 2002 
Until very recently, research into Ottoman counterinsurgency has been virtually 
nonexistent. If we are to better understand their methods then more research is ultimately 
necessary. However, based on what we know from the work of Ottoman experts on the 
First World War, we can safely make a few assumptions about their standards and 
techniques. It is clear that the Ottoman regular forces had generally operated with the 
intention of preventing death not instigating it. The Ottoman policy tended to be one of 
securing the safety of civilians rather than exacting revenge as a primary concern, 
Though it is also clear that many civilians did in fact suffer at the hands of Turks, both 
regular and irregular, most of the time the acts of violence were committed by 
undisciplined irregular troops and civilians who weTe more concerned with vengeance 
than conduct. It is understandable that such acts of violence would be at the forefront of a 
collective irregular consciousness because many of the men chosen to supplement 
225 Robert Taber, War a{fhe Flea.' The Classic Study afGuerrilla Warfare, (New York: Potomac 
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Ottoman reinforcements in the region were probably affected directly or indirectly by 
Armenian violence in the region. 
Prior to World War I, the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress 
had even tried to appease the Armenian Dashnak party by allowing them to carry 
weapons openly in the streets and to hold public office in the region, most likely to 
prevent the invasion of Russian forces. The result of which was of course the spreading 
of revolutionary ideas and the continuance of subversive activity in the Empire, which 
ultimately led to a Russian invasion of Anatolia anyway. When Ottoman forces could not 
be used to bring a swift and organized end to the rebellion, irregulars were the responders 
to the crises and the inevitable occurred. 
The assistance provided to the Russians by Armenian spies and scouts cannot be 
overstated nor should it be forgotten in the pages of history. Although the Armenian 
rebellion was only a small part of a much larger picture, their efforts were crucial to the 
invasion of Russian forces. Without Annenian participation, the Russians would not have 
been afforded all of the advantages that should have been in the Ottomans favor. 
Knowledge of terrain, troop movements, roads, effective retreat paths, defensive 
positions and safe passage were known to the Ottomans and not their Russian enemies. 
With the help of the Armenians, however, the Russians were able to utilize all of these in 
their invasion. Armenian knowledge of complex terrain made a Russian invasion that 
much easier in terms of navigating and utilizing geographic complexities with local 
support. Such aspects are still held in high regard concerning modem warfare and 
indigenous knowledge of terrain in both insurgent and counterinsurgent operations.226 It 
226 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 306 
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would be like trying to imagine the Normandy invasion of June 6, 1944 without the use 
of intelligence, disinformation and the 101 51 airborne division. 
Western support of the Armenians' cause also greatly hindered the efforts of the 
Ottomans to crush the rebellion before it had begun, perhaps saving the lives of 
thousands in the end. Support groups and fundraisers continued to prevent the Turks from 
mounting a successful campaign against their internal enemies. In one specific case, a 
British officer was recruiting an army of refugees in the area ofUrumia which was 
pinned between British and Turkish forces. The idea was to pull together a force large 
enough to repel the Turks. To help, "indiscreet American missionaries diverted some 
$100,000 in relief funds to support this 'Christian Army.' One of the missionary-relief 
workers, William Shedd, also the American vice consul at Urumia, seriously 
compromised the American government by signing in his capacity as vice consul an offer 
to pay the bills of the Christian army.,,227 Contributions such as this were generated by 
groups who intended to defeat the Muslim heathens and support their Christian brethren 
in the East. However, in order to facilitate a contribution from Americans, "what was 
needed was a victim (the Ottoman Christians), a hero (the missionaries), and a villain (the 
Turks). Turks and Kurds were portrayed as the sole: cause of the Christian's plight."228 
The ABCFM (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions) 
especially, had a vested interest in the well being of the Christian community in the 
Ottoman Empire, with special emphasis on the Armenians. Although the ABCFM 
claimed to strive for the salvation of mankind through the understanding of Christianity 
m Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East 1820-1960, (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1970), 158 
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and the western style orthodoxy, there was obviously greater emphasis on educating 
Ottoman subjects on western practices. This is confirmed by the number of schools built 
versus the number of churches. Between the time that the missionaries arrived in the 
Ottoman Empire and the time they were beginning to leave (1850-1913), they had built 
450 schools while only building 163 churches.229 
By drawing conclusions between counterinsurgency tactics before or since the 
First World War, this thesis demonstrated that justifiable conduct is in the eyes ofthe 
beholder. It is necessary to recognize that the Turks were not monsters but pragmatists 
faced with a nation in disarray and the destruction of their empire. Not to mention an 
uncertain fate for their Muslim subjects should they be defeated, a fate which had 
previously been proven worse than death and exile in the Balkans. Not only were their 
inspirations, and indeed some of their military tactics derived from Western military 
strategy prior to the war, but the Western powers of the twentieth century continued to 
operate under the same principles after World War 1. Napoleon Bonaparte wrote that 
"God is on the side with the best artillery." The same is true in the recognition of 
suffering during wartime. The condemnation of atrocities is generally heard from those 
with the loudest microphone or the boldest pen stroke. 
In his account of world history, H.G. Wells wrote of the Greco-Turkish war of 
1919-1922 saying, "The vitality of the Turk in this phase [post World War I recovery] 
was remarkable. He was not only driving back the attacking Greek, but he was, after his 
age-long tradition, massacring Armenians, and he was driving the French out of 
229 Cagri Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries," Yale Center for 
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Cilicia.,,23o Unfounded history written in such a suggestive manor is damaging to the best 
obtainable versions of the truth, the very purpose of writing history itself. Western 
historians to follow, in tum, draw inspiration from their predecessors and perpetuate 
myths of the "Terrible Turk" and his Armenian blood lust. 
The counterinsurgency techniques of the Ottomans have remained under Western 
scrutiny with regard to forced relocation. However, against all odds .. the Turks managed 
to maintain regional security and integrity after losing the greatest war the world had yet 
seen. The problem with counterinsurgency operations is that even with doctrinal theory 
and application, it is ultimately meant to be a bulleted remedy to a military problem, 
wrapped in a nice, neat package containing solutions to rapidly evolving tactics. Unlike 
regular warfare, counterinsurgency is a process which is rarely afforded a standard 
solution. Michael Schafer argues that, 
In fact, counterinsurgency doctrine obscures rather than illuminates critical 
distinctions among insurgency-threatened governments and the prospects for aid to them. 
As a result, past counterinsurgency operations were undertaken blind, while today the 
United States still lacks an ability to read the auguries for victory accurately.23I 
If nothing else, this argument highlights the need to adapt in irregular warfare and 
illustrates the many challenges faced regarding counterinsurgency operations even in the 
twenty-first century. 
Byron Farwell wrote of the Boer war saying: 
The methods by which guerrillas are overcome are, for humane men, unpalatable 
because they involve making war upon entire populations, upon those who in orthodox 
warfare are considered noncombatants. But as guerrillas are dependent upon the 
noncombatant populations for supplies, inf01mation, and other necessities, and the 
passive, if not active, support of the people among whom they move is essential, these 
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people - housewives who count the men and guns in the passing column, small boys who 
have seen the hiding soldiers in the their ambush, old men who know forgotten paths -
become a danger to the counter-guerrilla forces and minatory action is taken against 
them. So terrorism becomes a standard feature of guerrilla wars. 
Middle ground regarding counterinsurgency, irregular, guerrilla or whatever term you 
prefer to use, simply does not exist. Notions of man's humanity to his fellow man are 
often forgotten in all warfare when his way of life has been threatened. This is true of 
both the aggressor and the defender in virtually any conflict. Current counterinsurgency 
doctrine of the west strives for a more amiable solution. The fact remains, however, that 
in the context of the time, such measures were viewed as an unfortunate necessity in 
irregular warfare. 
Sean McMeekin wrote that, "Turkish historians, while acknowledging that 
thousands of innocents died in the course of the relocations, have tended to emphasize 
alleged Armenian treachery at SankaIm~, Van, Cilicia and elsewhere, which convinced 
the CUP government it had a fifth column on its hands.,,232 This thesis has illustrated that 
the threat was in fact very real, and the effectiveness of the Armenian revolutionaries was 
detrimental to Ottoman security in the East and esslential to the Russian invasion of 
Anatolia. McMeekin goes on to admit that the security threat was indeed real, yet, it was 
"overblown" and the Turks management of the forced relocations was "murderous.,,233 
Unfortunately, history written in such a way denotes the logistical challenges of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations while also fighting a multi-front war. 
Perhaps one of the greatest questions which remains unanswered in this thesis is:. 
were the Turks justified in their actions? Militarily, it is arguable that the Turks were 
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justified simply by examining the probability of annihilation. They had very little time to 
act and virtually no money to speak of in order to build camps or shelter in eastern 
Anatolia to house the refugee populations - both Muslim and Armenian. However, even 
if the Turks had the money and time for such projects, the camps would have to be built 
in an area far from the front toward the interior of the country, far enough away from the 
battlefield to ensure their safety. Therefore, the refugees would have had to make a long 
and arduous trek across county anyway. Also, as previous chapters have illustrated, as 
well as a number of scholars, the great killer of men at the time was epidemic; cholera, 
typhoid, frostbite, starvation etcetera. Disease and starvation killed most of the interned 
in the camps of South Africa and also the majority of interned in the Philippines both 
during and after the war. 
Were the Turks actions of the First World War morally justifiable in the forced 
relocations of thousands of civilians? Obviously not, however, it is important to 
remember that perceived necessity often dictates and even usurps morality in times of 
crisis. That is not to say that it is justified, yet it is evident that the Turks are not the only 
major power to make such a decision in the interest of security and stability. This was 
evident in the actions of the Americans in the Philippines and the British in South Africa 
as well. The only glaring difference between these lexamples of Western and Ottoman 
counterinsurgency is that the West was not directly threatened by insurgency on their 
own soil in the midst of a major war on multiple fronts. In its historical context, from a 
counterinsurgency standpoint, such decisions to move large numbers of civilians in the 
interest of security were a perfectly acceptable solution at that time. Such options are no 
longer viable in modem counterinsurgency operations. 
-104-· 
This thesis has demonstrated that, from the Ottoman perspective, there was a 
genuine belief in an imminent threat from the insurgent Armenian community. Countless 
Ottoman documents have shown that, based on intelligence, the Ottomans recognized the 
Armenian will to create their own state in the Ottoman Empire. Though they sided with 
Russia in their common hatred toward the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were willing 
to use the avenue of Russian support as a vehicle for attaining independence. It is also 
clear, based on Ottoman documents, that the Ottoman government perceived a real threat 
to the Muslim population of Eastern Anatolia, and that their decision to forcibly relocate 
Armenians was one also made in the interest of protecting its Muslim subjects from 
Armenian reprisal. 
This thesis has demonstrated the need for future researchers to recognize the 
challenges that counterinsurgency operators face, both in the past and the present. It is 
essential to remember that warfare, like history itself, is a sprawling and confused 
network of information that at times remains an enigma. Historians have a responsibility 
to strive for the best obtainable versions of the truth, remembering to always view 
research from a variety of angles so that students of history can make informed decisions. 
It does one well to remember that there will and have always been innumerable variables 
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